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Going into the project of writing a master thesis I there was one topic that had piqued my 
interest during my earlier studies, which I resolved to write about. This was the topic 
supernatural powers popping up in different aspects of Indian religion, culture and 
philosophy, variously called siddhis, yoga powers, aiśvaryas etc. Seeing as I am more 
familiar with Hinduism than other Indic religions, I tried to get a slight overview of which 
traditions and texts contain mentions of these sorts of supernatural powers, so I could focus 
on some or one of them and work out a relevant research question. I discovered that even 
ruling out other religions, descriptions of individuals with supernatural powers permeate 
various Hindu traditions and texts. They can be found in the Vedas, the major epics 
Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa, the purāṇas and in the texts of various philosophical schools 
and religious traditions. Individuals with supernatural powers are mentioned in different 
types of text from different times and they are ascribed to widely varied personas, beings, 
and awarded various states of acclaim or criticism. This discovery of the massive field that 
supernatural powers inhabit in Indian culture led me to the belief I would have an 
abundance of choices when narrowing down the field of my study for an appropriate theme. 
However, I was to be disappointed. At first I decided to narrow down my scope to various 
Śaiva and tantric traditions, since I read that these were the traditions with the most focus 
on gaining supernatural powers for various purposes. Gavin Flood for example, claims that 
the māntramarga Śaiva traditions are based on tantric texts of which the majority are 
“concerned with ritual of some kind […] for the purpose of attaining liberation and above 
all, magical power and pleasure in higher worlds” (Flood, 2005, p. 209) (see also 
(Sanderson, 1988, p. 667) and (Smith, 2010, p. 170). What I found, was that in most cases 
this was the extent of comment I would find about supernatural powers in these traditions.  
 
This also clearly became apparent at the beginning of this project, when I was trying to 
read up on the subject as much as I could. I started with articles in overview works like 
Brill’s encyclopedia of Hinduism (2009) edited by Knut Jacobsen et al. and The Blackwell 
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companion to Hinduism (2005) edited by Gavin Flood, reading entries on different 
sectarian traditions in Hinduism, especially Śaiva tantric ones. What I found was that many 
of these articles mentioned the division of practitioners and practices into mukti/mumukṣu 
and bhukti/bubhukṣu¸ the attainment of liberation on the one hand and worldly enjoyment 
on the other, which includes attainment of supernatural powers (Flood, 2005, p. 206). Even 
though supernatural powers were mentioned in most of such articles, they usually only got 
a few lines notice, maximally half a page. This is not to say that there are no works on such 
powers, but it showed quite clearly that they are not considered only important enough for 
a slight mention by most scholars. What spoke of the neglect even more clearly than this 
fact was the bibliography usually referred to in the mention of the mumukṣu and bubhukṣu 
division. Most of these were to three works, the article Le Sādhaka, personage oublié du 
Śivaīsme du Sud (1975) by Hélène Brunner, the article Meaning in Tantric Ritual (1995), 
and the monography Māyā Human and Divine (1978) by Teun Goudriaan. The first one I 
can sadly not use since I don’t know French, and nobody has considered the topic important 
enough to translate it. The second one, Māyā divine and human by Goudriaan is constructed 
around a translation and comment upon the Mahāmāyā, a Sanskrit fragment in a collection 
of Balinese hymns  describing “the supranormal effects of a meditation upon Viṣṇu’s 
Māyā” (Goudriaan, 1978 p. ix).  In addition to this, it refers to a large variety of text 
mentioning the topics of māyā ‘illusion’, the six “dark magics” ṣaṭkarmaṇ, divine power 
as an example for human supernatural power, and color symbolism. This book is a good 
starting point for understanding the large place ideas about supernatural powers inhabit in 
Indian culture. But even though it refers to a vast number of different texts, it is not an 
extensive presentation of supernatural powers in Hinduism, as Goudriaan self admits, 
rather a general discussion of various topics that occur in the specific text he has analyzed. 
That this book is likely still the most elucidating publication on the topic of supernatural 
powers in Hindu traditions, speaks for the neglect of the topic by scholars in general. 
The third article mentioned is the article by Alexis Sanderson, and it showed to me 
the height of the problem I was facing. Sanderson explains that the goal of this article is to 
“consider the theories of the purpose and meaning of ritual of right and left” (Sanderson, 
1995, p. 22) i.e. different traditions of Kashmir Śaivism. In other words, Sanderson in this 
article discusses the reasons, given in the religious texts, for initiates in different Śaiva 
traditions to perform the daily and yearly rituals of worship to a god. However, he only 
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comments on supernatural instance twice. In the first instance, he explains how 
worshippers of the Śaiva cult were split between the ones seeking mumukṣu ‘liberation’, 
and those seeking bubhukṣu, which he explains as supernatural powers and effects, and the 
enjoyments of rewards in a paradise like world, either in this life or the next. Furthermore 
he explains that his article will discuss the ritual of the seekers of mumukṣu because 
 
The seekers of rewards, more precisely titled sādhakas (“masterers [of powers]”), inflected 
the basic rituals of the cults for the attainment of specific and concrete objectives such as 
the quelling of dangerous powers (śāntiḥ), the subjugation of desired women 
(vaśīkaraṇam), or the liquidation of enemies. In such cases the purpose of the ritual is self-
evident (Sanderson, 1995, p. 24). 
 
After this Sanderson mentions how the path to reward was the more time-consuming one 
of the two, and that the majority of the Śaivites in Kashmir aspired towards the path of 
liberation. Later on, he briefly explains how both the seeker of liberation and the seeker of 
rewards must become Śiva through the ritual, and that the seeker of rewards then directs 
the power of Śiva to achieve whichever ends he wants, while for the seeker of liberation 
“it must be the end itself” (Sanderson, 1995, p. 43). These two brief comments of bubhukṣu 
(which the acquirement of supernatural powers is a part of) shows that Sanderson is not 
particularly interested in them. This is not necessarily a problem in itself since the article 
is not really about the seekers of bubhukṣu at all. However, I would argue that it shows 
how little literature and studies there have been on this field, when overview articles to an 
article like this for the idea of supernatural powers. What is more, Sanderson’s comment 
that the meaning of rituals for the attainment of supernatural powers is self-evident seems 
to be symptomatic of the whole field. Most texts authors I’ve read just briefly remark that 
some people wanted to achieve supernatural powers, but that that was a lower form of 
rewards compared to liberation if they mention them at all. A good example is scholarly 
writing on the Yogasūtra, which has a section dedicated to the acquirement of supernatural 
powers, there called vibhūti.1 The term has a variety of meanings, one of which is 
“superhuman power” (Pflueger, 2005, p. 46, note 32), and is often associated with what 
Lloyd Pflueger calls “the eight classical supernormal powers” (Pflueger, 2005, p. 50) of 
                                                 
1 This is arguably the most important text for yoga traditions, more on this in chapter 2. 
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miniaturization, magnification, levitation, extension, irresistible desire, lordship, sovereign 
command and wish realization. The topic of vibhūti, which in the Yogasūtra includes a lot 
of other supernatural powers, is the one topic given the most space in the whole text 
(Pflueger, 2005, p. 51). Yet, scholars have largely ignored them or written them off as a 
residue of archaic magical practices, and Pflueger states that their inclusion in the 
Yogasūtra “proves an embarrassment for many modern scholars’ enlightenment prejudices 
about what Indian philosophy ought to be” (Pflueger, 2005, p. 54).   
 
My point with this example is to show, through a one of the most researched texts of Indian 
religion that the topic of supernatural powers has been given too little attention and 
research. After this discovery, I wanted to try and find a research question which allows 
me to shed a small amount of light on the importance supernatural powers. I do not believe 
that it is good academic practice to deem any aspect of what you are trying to study as 
unimportant or irrelevant without critical study to show that they in fact are. This is what 
many scholars of Indian culture have done in relation to supernatural powers  (and which 
often has been the case in relation to anything labeled magic by academics). Are they 
interrelated with other aspects of Indian culture in ways that justify further delving 
research? Do scholars have to take notions about supernatural powers and individuals who 
are said to use/have them into account as a part of the context of the facet of Indian culture 
they are studying? This is of course a very broad question that I have no chance to answer 
in a masters thesis. What I decided to do to contribute to this question however, was to 
analyze a few cases of studies on supernatural powers with the tools of critical discourse 
theory to see if in these cases, ideas about supernatural powers have any impact, or are tied 
in with, other aspects of the text/traditions they appear in. My claim is that if supernatural 
powers can be shown to be part of claims made by certain social groups in a discourse of 
power, they cannot be discarded as unimportant or irrelevant without being properly 
studied. Therefore, I have chosen three articles which discuss ideas of supernatural powers 
found in texts from different times, featuring different religious traditions with struggles 
in different types of discourses. This is not to say that they are representative or that the 
findings on these cases can be transferred to all other cases where supernatural powers are 
mentioned; I am merely trying to figure out if supernatural powers can be a factor in 
discourse affecting other aspects of culture, with the claim that if they can, they should not 
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be discarded without proper study. Below I will try to give a more detailed description of 
what these supernatural powers are, and thereafter present some of the research history on 
the topic. After this there will follow an outline of the thesis, and a presentation of the 
articles that I have based this study on. 
 
 
What are supernatural powers in Indian context? 
The powers I am going to write about in my thesis are aptly described by Jacobsen in Yoga 
Powers – Extraordinary Capacities Attained Through Meditation and Concentration 
(2012), a collection of articles about powers attained through meditation and concentration: 
 
“Yoga powers are forms of extraordinary knowledge, such as awareness of previous 
rebirths, knowing the minds of others, seeing distant and hidden things, and remarkable 
abilities such as the power to become invisible, enter other’s bodies, fly through the air, and 
to become disembodied for a period of time, which are traditionally thought to be attained 
as yogins progress in their practice.” (Jacobsen, 2012 p. 1) 
 
The articles in Jacobsen’s book all deal with these powers as they are described in the 
context of Yoga traditions, and this is why he calls them yoga powers. However, later on 
he remarks that these powers are not exclusive to the yoga tradition, they are also believed 
to be available through other means like asceticism, herbs, mantras or even as inborn 
abilities, and also feature in other religious traditions (Jacobsen, 2012 p. 4f). Accordingly, 
this thesis will therefore include texts who deal with supernatural powers outside of any 
yoga traditions, most notably the tantric tradition, although most of my source material 
deals with yoga traditions in one form or another. Yoga and Tantra traditions are the 
context where it will be most heavily situated. Jacobsen goes on to list the terms used to 
describe these yoga powers, in different traditions and texts, among them jñāna, aiśvarya, 
siddhi and vibhūti in the Yogasūtra, bala in the Mahābhārata, guṇa in haṭhayoga works, 
guṇāṣṭaka and more often siddhi in Śaiva Tantric conetxts, iddhi, abhiññā, adhiṣṭhāna and 
vikurvaṇa in Buddhist Pāli texts and ṛddhi and labdhi in Jain texts.  This clearly shows that 
the idea of these kinds of power is widely spread throughout Indian culture. It also 
emphasize the problematic nature of trying to delimit what should count, and not count, as 
supernatural, or any other term one might choose, as Jacobsen later on also states that these 
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terms not necessarily always mean exactly the same thing. Jacobsen further notes that the 
term most commonly used by scholars to denote the conglomerate of superhuman powers 
mentioned above, both gained through yoga and other means, is siddhi (Jacobsen, 2012 p. 
2f). The three authors that this thesis focuses on however use other terms. Malinar, like 
Jacobsen, calls them “yoga powers” because the instances she discusses all describe 
powers acquired through the practice of yoga. Rastelli mostly uses the term “mantrasiddhi” 
following the text she is using, but also sometimes uses the designation “magic”. Burchett 
categorizes the use of powers into “magic” and “miracle” on account of the texts he is 
studying, and other sources I have used use these or different terms, like sorcery, siddhi, 
vibhūti etc. Because of the variety in descriptions I have chosen to use the term 
“supernatural power” when referring to the powers described by Jacobsen above. This is 
to avoid the term magic, or similar ones, with all its negative connotations (see e.g. 
(Stratton, 2007)) . When referring to a specific instance, for example the description of 
power gained by the sādhaka described in chapter 5, I will however use the term the authors 
of my sources have chosen, and this is another reason why I chose to use an English 




As I have shown above, research on the topic of supernatural powers in Indian history has 
been neglected. Teun Goudriaan in his book from 1978 Māyā divine and human points out 
“the absence of a badly needed general history of Sanskritized magic” (Goudriaan, 1978 
p. xi), and, as far as I know, this kind of work has not been written in the time since either. 
Jacobsen opens the introduction in his book claiming that yoga powers is a “neglected topic 
in the research on yoga and South Asian meditation traditions”(Jacobsen, 2012 p. 1), and 
he later notes that the treatment of yoga powers often is, and has been, avoided in favor of 
scholars’ desire to emphasize the rationality and philosophy in Indian traditions. (Jacobsen, 
2012 p. 14)  This also applies to the study of siddhis outside of yoga traditions. There are, 
however, some works Jacobsen recommends for introduction to the topic of siddhis: the 
aforementioned Māyā divine and human by Goudriaan, The Alchemical Body: Siddha 
Traditions in Medieval India (White, 1996) and Understanding Mantra (Alper, 1989) 
(Jacobsen, 2012 p. 4f). The work by Goudriaan has already been mentioned, and will be 
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used for background information. The book, The Alchemical Body: Siddha Traditions in 
Medieval India by White discusses the topics of Alchemy, sexual rites and Haṭhayoga, 
which he claims are related and all have the purpose of acquiring immortality and 
supernatural powers. This book will also be used.  
The last book Jacobsen refers to once again shows the scholarly neglect of the topic 
of supernatural powers. Understanding Mantra (1989) is a collection of articles about 
mantras. However, even though André Padoux in the article “Mantras-What are they?” 
referring to supernatural powers and magical effects, states that mantras “are clearly used 
much more often to gain such powers or to produce such effects than for redemptive 
purposes” (Padoux, 1989, p. 310), none of the article focuses on these powers and effects. 
In the article “The Pāñcarātra attitude to mantra”, Sanjukta Gupta briefly explains that 
“All tantric practice is said to have the two goals of mukti and bhukti, liberation and 
enjoyment (won by the use of power)” (Gupta, 1989, p. 233) but only states that the 
mantras granting bhukti are seen as a lower class, later to be superseded by the practitioner 
so he can use the higher class of mantras, which lead to mukti. I therefore have chosen to 
not use this work in my study, and rely instead on the two books mentioned above, in 
addition to works referred to in the articles my study revolves around.  
 
 
Presentation of each case 
The three different cases I have chosen to present and build my thesis on represent different 
times and different religious traditions in India. They can all be described as “Hindu 
traditions”, but as this term is widely discussed (see e.g.Viswanathan, 2005), and as such a 
discussion is not relevant for this thesis, I will not go into it. It suffices to say that the 
traditions presented are all part of a larger Indian culture, and therefore have a lot of shared 
ideas and reference points.  Each case is described in an article which discusses 
supernatural powers in relations to a particular religious tradition. These are Angelika 
Malinar’s discussion about how supernormal powers where central to discussions of 
liberation as claimed by the Yoga/Sāṃkhya traditions in the Mahābhārata; a discussion 
about the supernormal powers gained through the mastering of the mantrasiddhi by the 
sādhaka of the Pañcarātra tradition in Marion Rastelli’s article about the Jayākhyasaṃhitā; 
and a discussion by Patton Burchett about bhakti texts from the 16th 18th century, which 
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claim the miracle powers of the bhakti saints trump the supernormal powers of the Nāth 
yogins. The common denominator of these articles, and the reason I chose them for this 
thesis is that they all portray struggles within or between traditions where supernatural 
powers play a significant part. In Malinar’s article the struggle is for the issue of what is 
the “right” or “highest” liberation and how to obtain it. In Marion Rastelli the struggle is 
less obvious, but I will make the claim that the way the mantrasiddhi and the mastering of 
them are portrayed could well have been part of a larger struggle between different 
religious groups for both patrons or “clients” and for the extraordinary individuals which 
served as the religious elite in the same traditions. In Patton’s article, the struggle is more 
explicit, here it is a clear case of “my power is stronger than yours, therefore my tradition 
is better”. Another reason why I chose these articles to base my study around, is that their 
discussions have a relatively small scope and are based on not too big of a text material. 
Malinar discusses four different parts of the Mahābharata¸ Rastelli bases her work on one 
of the Pāñcarātra texts, while Burchett analyzes several Sufi and bhakti Hagiographical 
stories from early modern time North India. Other works like Goudriaan’s Māyā Human 
and Divine (1978) and David White’s The Alchemical Body (1996) and Sinister Yogis 
(2009) extensively treat the topic of supernatural powers, but their source material is so 
vast and spread out both considering time and different religious traditions, that it would 
be difficult to discuss them with the tools of discourse analysis. The cases I have chosen 
all rely on a smaller selection of text, and this means they can more reliably be said to be 
part of the same, or at least related discourses.  
 
 
Outline of the thesis 
Chapter two of this thesis is a background chapter where I try to give a short overview over 
topics that will be discussed more in later chapters, namely the Śamkhya tradition, yoga 
traditions, the Bhakti tradition and the Tantra tradition. The presentation I give of them is 
in no way exhaustive, but is meant to be a general introduction making it possible to discuss 
certain more detailed topics in later chapter. I also have to note that I do not discuss the 
modern versions of any of these traditions, as the discourses I will be studying all are 
situated several centuries in the past. Chapter three will be a theory and method chapter 
where I present the discourse theory (which is both a method and a theory) I will use in 
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this study. In chapters 4-6 I will present the discourses mentioned above as described by 
the authors of the articles I have chosen. The analysis of each discourse will start in the end 
of each of the respecting chapters, before I do a summary and general discussion in chapter 






























In the later analysis chapters I will present material from various times and traditions of 
Indian Hinduism, which all treat supernatural powers in different ways. In this chapter I 
will try to give a general description of some of the traditions that form the contexts of the 
material I will be analyzing, which are the traditions of Yoga, Sāṃkhya, Bhakti, and 
Tantra. Each of these consist of a multitude of various traditions, movements, texts etc., 
and they all constitute large discourses which frequently overlap. The treatment of them 
below is therefore to be understood as a general description to make it easier to place and 




As done by Jacobsen I will use the capital, ‘Yoga’, when talking about the specific 
philosophic darśana (school), and ‘yoga’ for the “movement” in general, or specific 
schools/traditions that are not part of the darśana. (See more on this later in the chapter). 




Knut Jacobsen, Professor in Studies of Religion at the university of Bergen, has written a 
lot on Indian religions in general, and about yoga in particular, and I will use his 
introduction to the anthology Theory and Practice of Yoga: Essays in the Honour of Gerald 
James Larson (2005) to try to give a tentative overview of the vast theme of yoga2, before 
introducing a different view on what yoga was, as it is presented by David Gordon White, 
Professor of Comparative Religion at the university of Chicago.  
 According to Jacobsen yoga refers to “traditions of mental and physical discipline 
and the goal to be achieved by those disciplines” (Jacobsen, 2005, p. 4). Jacobsen explains 
                                                 
2 I will not og into the topic off modern yoga since that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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what he calls yoga in its classical form, i.e. as it is found in the Yogasūtra by Patañjali, as 
the cessation of the minds activity, which will lead to salvation through the realization of 
the duality of the consciousness and the material body (more on this below). He stresses 
the fact that yoga does not mean ‘unity’ in its classical form, but rather denotes separation 
(Jacobsen, 2005, p. 4).  In this statement, we can already glimpse the complexity of the 
term yoga, because it is both a technique and a goal, and these can both be vastly different 
depending on which traditions and which times you refer to. The definition above stems 
from the text that has generally been considered the root text of what is called the classical 
yoga, both by scholars and later yoga traditions, but as we will see, some argue that there 
is no such thing as ‘classical yoga’ because the multitude of traditions and interpretations 
of the term is just to vast. Yoga as it is presented in the Yogasūtra relies heavily on the 
philosophical system called Sāmkhya (I will present this below) and Jacobsen refers to it 
as the Yoga-Sāmkhya darśana (philosophical school) which later split into two different 
darśanas.  In the yoga traditions that rely on the Sāmkhya framework, defining yoga as 
‘union’ would make little sense, but as we will see later, this definition may have been 
closer to the original meaning of the word, and is also describes the goal of other types of 
yoga. The picture is muddied even more by the fact that the word ‘yoga’ can be used in 
more general terms without referring to any of the abovementioned, but with the meaning 
of ‘method’, ‘technique’ or ‘goal’ (Jacobsen, 2005p. 4). Jacobsen traces the origins of yoga 
to several elements from different texts and traditions. He mentions ideas about mental 
concentration leading to liberation and yogic ideas like the internal sound of the body, and 
the vital breaths and veins found in the Upaniṣads, regulation of breath in the later Vedic 
texts, bodily postures and other ascetic practices (tapas) for the Vedic sacrificial priest, and 
the ecstatic’s ascetic vows (vrātya) in the Vedas. He also notes that especially the 
performing of tapas was thought to bestow the practitioner supernatural powers. The 
forerunners to the Yoga darśana therefore had two goals, liberation on the one hand, and 
supernatural powers on the other (as we will see, they sometimes also coincided). The idea 
of supernatural powers being a goal of yoga was denounced in the later Yoga darśana, but 
stayed prevalent in other yoga traditions and some of the Tantra traditions which 






David Gordon White on the other hand construes a different narrative of yoga, presented 
in the book Sinister Yogis (2009).  He starts with the question of why yoga, which derives 
from the verbal root yuj meaning “to yoke” and “means “union,” “joining,” “junction” – is 
interpreted to mean its opposite” (White, 2009, p. 38).  The opposite would be separation, 
with the meaning that he who practices yoga separates himself from the senses, from 
emotions, from the outside world etc. through meditation. This is often described as the 
core of yoga, so much that yoga has often been equated with meditation or contemplation 
(White, 2009, p. 42). White is trying to trace the process in which the primary meaning of 
the word yoga shifted from union to separateness for some groups. Here he also criticizes 
many earlier works on the history of yoga, because he claims scholars have only paid 
attention to these groups, and constructed their view as “the classical yoga”, while ignoring 
the groups that kept what he claims is the original meaning of the term yoga. (White, 2009, 
p.38) His presentations of some of these groups will have an important part of the analysis 
in later chapters, especially when dealing with the chapter on yoga powers in the 
Mahābhārata. I will therefore give a short overview on his presentation of the history of 
yoga, with special focus on the parts that will be important later. 
 He claims that the works which have been described as capstones of the “classical 
yoga” were the culmination of a 500 year period in which a “new synthesis of theory and 
practice, sometimes referred to as “yoga”, was very much in vogue throughout South 
Asia”. (White, 2009, p.39) This lead to these works themselves showing a wide variety of 
topics and interpretations related to the term “yoga”. What is more, White claims the idea 
that these texts, and the system of “classical yoga” contrary to earlier scholars assumptions 
were not the culmination of long traditions going back to the time of the Vedas, but a 
product of this new synthesis. The major continuity with those earlier traditions he claims, 
was the importance of vibhūthi, which White translates as “omni-presencing” (White, 
2009, p. 39) and which is the title of the chapter in the Yoga Sūtra describing how to attain 
supernatural powers. He goes on to describe the various early meanings of the verb root 
yuj*, and its derivatives, including yoga. The two primary early meanings where the yoking 
of people to chariots, mainly the warrior to his rig of war, and the sacrificial patron to the 
chariot of sacrifice, in addition to the “poetic yokings of thought to word” (White, 2009, p. 
63) which allowed the Vedic priest to yoke his mind to both this world and the heavenly 
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world through poetic inspiration during the sacrifice. Throughout the book he describes 
how these to meanings of the word “coalesced, from the time of the Vedas onward, into a 
unified body of practice in which yoga involved yoking oneself to other beings from a 
distance […] either in order to control them or in order to merge one’s consciousness with 
theirs.” (White, 2009, p. 44). Most relevant for this thesis is White’s discussion about yoga 
as the practice of piercing the sun and thereby gaining entrance into heaven, and how this 
was expanded on, and subsumed beneath other kinds of yoga emerging in the time of the 




White claims that before the epic period, which he states to be ca 200BC – 400CE (White, 
2009, p. 60), the root yuj and its derivate yoga had two specific meaning: “the yoking of a 
wheeled conveyance to a draft animal and, by extension, the linkage between a visionary 
thinker’s mind or consciousness to some transcendent object” (White, 2009, p. 60) In both 
cases the yoking enabled travels outwards or upwards. Closely tied to the concept of yoking 
in the first meaning is the idea of traveling to the sun. This was since in the Vedas, where 
“the afterlife was attained by “traveling to or through the sun on a ritually constructed 
chariot”. (White, 2009, p. 61) The chariot, or sometimes boat, was the sacrifice itself, and 
the patron of the sacrifice was yoked to it, every timed he sacrificed. This enabled him (his 
initiation body that is, while his mundane body stayed behind) to ascend up to the heavenly 
world, its gate being the disk of the sun, before descending to this world again once the 
sacrifice was over. This was repeated daily, so that when he died, the sacrifice of his 
cremated body would be the chariot that carried him to heaven where he would now stay 
permanently. In addition to the patron being yoked to the sacrifice,  (White, 2009, p.61f) 
White notes that “the most common rigvedic meaning of the verb *yuj […] was “to yoke 
one’s self to a chariot” and by extension, “to prepare for battle.”” (White, 2009, p. 63) The 
yoga was here the rig of the warrior who went to, or prepared for war. In later texts the 
chariot of the warrior could take on the same meaning of piercing the disk of the sun as the 
chariot of sacrifice for the patron. This is seen in the epics, where there are several accounts 
of warrior dying on the battlefield, who are then yoked to the sacrifice of their own death, 
which enables them to pierce the disk of the sun and enter the realms of the gods. The 
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chariot is sometimes also said to be the sun’s rays, which descend and the warrior is yoked 
to. (White, 2009, p. 67) 
The other meaning points to the practice of Vedic priest who were said to yoke their 
mind to poetic inspiration, which allowed them to join the world of sacrifice to the heavenly 
realm they were trying to reach through it. (White, 2009, p. 63) In this way they linked the 
human and divine worlds, and were able to undertake “visionary expeditions to the furthest 




The philosophical system of yoga is related to the Sāṃkhya school, and draws on Sāṃkhya 
ideas and terminology, also when referring to supernatural powers. I will therefore give a 
short introduction on Sāṃkhya in this chapter, because it will be necessary for 
understanding some of the points made in later chapters. This especially applies to chapter 
4, because Malinar explains how a Sāṃkhya framework enables explanation for why yoga 
powers are deemed necessary for attaining liberation. To give this short introduction I will 
rely on the entry on ‘Sāṃkhya’ in Brill’s Encyclopedia of Hinduism written by Jacobsen. 
Jacobsen describes Sāṃkhya as a “system of religious thought […] which traces its 
origin to the sage Kapila” (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 685). The Sāṃkhya became an organized 
system of religious thought in the first centuries CE, but its constituting terminology and 
ideas go back several hundred years before. Jacobsen stresses the plurality of various 
Sāṃkhya traditions with “more or less parallel doctrines” both before and after the creation 
of the Sāṃkhya darśana, and of the fact that some Sāṃkhya traditions were non-
philosophical but theological and/or mythological. Sāṃkhya as a darśana (one of six 
traditional philosophical schools of Indian thought) was based on the Ṣaṣṭitantra (100-200 
CE), this was however lost, so Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhyakārikā (350-400) and its 
commentaries, is considered the schools foundational text (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 685). Below 
I give a short presentation of the principles that according to the Sāṃkhya view constitute 




The Sāṃkhya way of categorizing the world, with or without the specific Sāṃkhya 
terminology, has according to Jacobsen had an enormous impact on Indian philosophy and 
theology (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 688).  
 
 
Principles of reality 
Sāṃkhya is a philosophy of dualism and explains the existence and workings of the human 
self and its way to liberation, in addition to the creation and ontological status of cosmos. 
According to the Sāṃkhyakārikā the cosmos and everything in it consists of 25 different 
tattvas (principle). The first tattva, and one of two ultimate principles, is puruṣa, the self, 
both of the universe, and of each individual. Puruṣa is pure consciousness, and is 
characterized as inactive, irreducible, without parts, eternal, independent, uncaused, unable 
of creation, (the subject). Its counterpart is the second tattva, prakṛti, sometimes also 
referred to as pradhāna. Prakṛti is the material source of everything in the universe, and is 
active, nonconscious, productive, the object. Like puruṣa, it is an ultimate principle/matter 
and is therefore eternal, uncaused, independent and irreducible. Another important 
difference between the two principles is that there is only one prakṛti which is the cause of 
everything material, while there are multiple puruṣas, with each being’s self consisting of 
a separate puruṣa. Prakṛti possesses three guṇas ‘qualities’, sattva rajas and tamas, which 
Jacobsen describes as “lightweight and illuminating (sattva), stimulating and moving 
(rajas), and heavy and enveloping (tamas)” (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 692). Since prakṛti is the 
source of everything material, all things (except puruṣa) consist of these three guṇas, 
indeed it is the ratio of the three properties who lead to infinite variation. The remaining 
23 tattvas are products of prakṛti, and are: buddhi (intellect), ahaṃkāra (ego), manas 
(mind), 5 buddhīndriyas (sense capacities), 5 karmendriyas (action capasities), 5 tanmātras 
(subtle material principles) and 5 mahābhūtas (gross elements). Furthermore when talking 
about prakṛti one has to distuinguish between its avyakta (unmanifest) form, which is the 
24th principle, and its vyakta (manifest) form, which is prakṛti as constituting the remaining 
23 tattvas (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 691). 
Not only the cosmos, but also every human consists of the 25 tattvas. Each human 
possesses an individual puruṣa, which is that persons self, or consciousness. To end the 
suffering of endless rebirths, the saṃsāra is the goal of all the Sāṃkhya traditions, and this 
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is attained through discriminate knowledge of the different tattvas. Once the mind 
understands that the puruṣa, which is the self and the consciousness is not identical to the 
subtle body and the gross body, the puruṣa, who is only bound to saṃsāra through its 
association with prakṛti, will be liberated.  
According to Jacobsen other non-philosophical Sāṃkhya traditions had similar 
enumerations of tattvas, however in some of them the number of tattvas are different. The 
order of enumeration is also different. The tattvas enlisted in the Sāṃkhyakārikā begin with 
puruṣa and prakṛti as tattva one and two, while in non-philosophical Sāṃkhya the 
enumeration starts with the earth mahābhūta as the first tattva and ends with prakṛti and 
puruṣa as the 24th and 25th tattva. Jacobsen explains the reason for this being that Sāṃkhya 
traditions were mainly ways of attaining mokṣa through a realization of ever ‘higher’ 
constituents of being, were the practitioner worked himself up from the first tattva until the 
25th and only puruṣa remained. This was then turned around in classical Sāṃkhya, and 
Jacobsen theorizes this was because of the emphasis on cosmogony in Indian philosophy 
in general at that time (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 686). Similar for all Sāṃkhya traditions is idea 
of the dualistic nature between consciousness and matter, and that one has to understand 
this difference to attain salvation. In early Sāṃkhya traditions, also in some parts of the 
Mahābhārata, this difference is not always described in the terms of puruṣa and prakṛti, 
but still refers to the view that  
 
the self is different from the body-and-mind complex, which humans usually identify as 
themselves, that ignorance of this difference is the cause of suffering, and that the 
realization of the fundamental difference of self and matter is he salvific knowledge 
(Jacobsen, 2011, p. 689). 
 
This view is also found in the Mahābhārata, and will more closely described in chapter 4. 
For now it suffices to highlight that on Sāṃkhya found in the Mahābhārata Jacobsen states 
that it “is not always a system of philosophy, but seems more to refer to a way of thinking 
about the world by the means of certain concepts and a particular method for the sake of 
salvific liberation”, and that both monistic, dualist and theistic interpretations are found in 
the Mahābhārata (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 685). In Chapter 4 I will discuss how these different 
interpretations of the Sāṃkhya framework contribute to a different status to supernatural 
power particularly in relation to liberation.  
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Jacobsen also notes the shared origins of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga darśanas, and 
claims that “ the Yoga system is also a part of Sāṃkhya pluralism” (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 
687). By Yoga system he here means the Yoga darśana, the systematic school of Yoga 
founded on Patañjali’s Yogasūtra and Vyāsabhāṣya (Vyāsa’s commentary on it), 
systematized by Vindhyavāsin (350-400) into the Yogaśāstra. Jacobsen claims this school, 
often known as Patañjala Yoga, originated as a Sāṃkhya school of thought, and only 




Bhakti is a concept, also sometimes referred to as a Hindu tradition, which will be relevant 
for the discussion in chapter 4 and chapter 6. Here, I will give a short presentation on the 
concept its and history, based on Professor at the Department of Religions at the University 
of Florida, Vasudha Narayan’s entrance “Bhakti” in Brill’s Encyclopedia of Hinduism. 
Narayan translates bhakti  as devotion, and claims that it “has probably been the most 
visible, palpable part of the Hindu traditions in the last two millennia” (Narayanan, 2010, 
p. 710).  She describes it as the practice of worshipping a deity, teacher or other devotees, 
often with song and dance. This devotional worship is conducted both in private and public 
places, like the home or the temple. There is a rich literature of bhakti poetry, songs and 
prose texts, and the “Epic and puranic stories in all Indian languages are part of the bhakti 
literature” (Narayanan, 2010, p. 710). Bhakti can take many forms, it can be exclaimed 
through mental or physical worship, disciplined or excessively emotional, but it “is almost 
always used in a religious sense and involves an acceptance of the supremacy of the object 
of worship” (Narayanan, 2010 p. 710). Narayan exclaims that many Hindus see bhakti as 
being a tradition of reverent worship and devotion to the deity starting already in the Vedic 
period, with the Vedic hymns and sacrificial rites, but that it is from the time of the Epics 
the “articulation of the mental, intellectual, and emotional intensity of devotion is 
appreciably evident” (Narayanan, 2010, p. 710). In this period bhakti becomes an important 
concept also in philosophical speculation, as is evident e.g. in the Bhagavadgītā. The 
general idea in bhakti traditions is that mokṣa is not realized through the individuals own 
effort, like in other traditions of the time whether it be through ascetic practices, meditation 
or knowledge, but through divine grace. The bhakta should surrender completely to the 
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deity, which in turn grants him or her deliverance from the saṃsāra, indifferent of the 
individual’s karma. Mokṣa in the bhakti traditions is also often thought of as being in the 
deity’s presence, or become one with the deity. Another difference with other traditions at 
the time, was that, at least in theory, everyone could receive the divine grace for their 
devotion, in spite of gender and caste. This meant that bhakti offered a way to salvation 
also to women and low caste members, unlike most other traditions, which only saw 
salvation as obtainable for high caste men. (Narayanan, 2010, p. 711) 
An important ritual context for bhakti is the pūjā in temples and homes, which 
emerged in its current form throughout the 1st millennium CE, along with devotional songs 
and poetry. The composers of these became known as poet-saints, and the earliest  
important groups of these where the Ālvārs which sang Viṣṇu’s praise, and the Nāyanārs 
who were devoted to Śiva (Narayanan, 2010, p. 713). This was the beginning of a vast 
tradition of devotional songs and poetry, which were expressed through dance and music, 
being composed by bhakti devotees in their vernacular languages. Narayan explains how 
the conventional narrative depicts a bhakti movement with poet-saints as the leading 
figures, as beginning in the south, and then sweeping all over India. The Ālvārs and the 
Nāyanārs composed in Tamil and lived in the 7th-9th century CE, while the famous bhakti 
poets from further north in India lived in the 14th-17th century. Narayan however explains 
that the idea that bhakti emerged in the South and then was brought to the north through 
the travels and veneration of different poet-saints is only a partial picture, there are also 
examples of devotion to deities like Rāma and Kṛṣṇa who began in the north and then 




Gavin Flood, Professor of Hindu Studies and Comparative Religion gives a short 
introduction to the topic of Tantrism in the monography The tantric body (2006). In this 
book Flood argues that the specific tantric ritual is the internalizing of the tradition through 
an inscription of the tantric text onto the body (Flood, 2006, p.100), and he uses the 
description of the bhūtaśuddhi ‘purification of the elements’ ritual from the 
Jayākhyasaṃhitā for his analysis. This is one of the most important texts in the Pañcarātra 
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tradition, and the same text Marion Rastelli uses for her discussion of the attainment of 
supernatural powers by the sādhaka which will be discussed in chapter 5.  
He explains that the “term ‘tantric tradition’ refers to those religions […] that 
claimed to develop from textual sources referring to themselves as ‘tantras’, regarded as 
revelation, the word of God, by their followers” (Flood, 2006, p. 8). These traditions arose 
in Jainism, Hinduism and Buddhism during the first centuries CE. The Hindu tantras were 
seen revealed by either Viṣṇu, Śiva, Devī (the Goddess) or Sūryā, and their respective 
traditions called Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, Śākta an Saura. Flood claims that these stood in 
opposition to the orthodox Brahmanism, as they either rejected or claimed to be superior 
to the revelation of the Vedas. The followers of the orthodox Brahmanism are sometimes 
referred to as vaidika, while the followers of tantric traditions are named tāntrika. This 
distinction however, Flood claims, is not a definite one, since some of the former observe 
tantric rites, and some late Vedic texts being “clearly tantric in character” (Flood, 2006, p. 
8). Flood points out that defining tantrism is difficult, but that a salient feature is the 
practitioners quest for power. This could be both the power to transcend the world, or to 
rule over it, i.e. to attain both bubhukṣu and mumukṣu. He further claims that this is usually 
done by a divinization of the body trough ritual. David White, who claims that “Tantra has 
been the predominant religious paradigm, for over a millennium, of the great majority of 
the inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent” (White, 2003, p. 3), lists ritual techniques of 
mantras, possession and sacrificial offerings, for the purpose of controlling various beings 
as being essential tantric practices. He further distinguishes between “soft core” and “hard 
core” tantric traditions (White, 2003, p. 13). The former consists of “mainstream” practices 
like using maṇḍalas ‘diagrams’, mantras and mūdras ‘handsigns’ etc. in a ritual practice 
to appease a deity or other supernatural being, and corresponds to the view of tantrism 
presented above by Flood, and the Pāñcarātra, at least as it is presented in the 
Jayākhyasaṃhitā is an example of such a “soft core” tradition. The characteristic feature 
that is emphasized in “hard core” tantrism, and in contrast to the features listed above is 
specific for only tantric traditions are sexualized ritual practices centered around sexual 
fluids as a divine power substance. The Nāth tradition described in chapter 6 is a reformed 










This chapter is about the theory and method I will use to discuss supernatural powers in 
the upcoming chapters. Since this thesis is about how ideas about supernatural power are 
related to other aspects of Indian culture, I have chosen to use discourse analysis as both 
method and theory. The premise of discourse analysis is to study how the way reality is 
represented also shapes and changes it (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 9), 
therefore it gives access to tools that are useful for my analysis. Since there is no systematic 
method of discourse analysis developed specifically for the study of religions, it is 
necessary to find a theory and method that gives access to the specific field of study in a 
meaningful way (Hjelm, 2014, (2011), p. 134f). I do not have access to individual 
utterances, or even original texts, only translations and other academics interpretations of 
the meaning of these original texts, and can therefore not use theories or method that focus 
on the details of conversation or text interpretation. I have chosen to use theories that focus 
on the creation and representation of meaning and how it can change society on a more 
general and abstract level. With inspiration from historian of Religion Eva Hellman3, I am 
going to use Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theory, and Norman 
Fairclough’s discourse analysis. Before I presents those, I will give a general introduction 
of discourse analysis as described in Marianna Winther Jørgensen and Louise Phillips 
introductory book Diskurs analyse som teori og metode (1999), who also discuss both 
theories mentioned at length. Lastly, I will explain how I plan to use some of the terms 




Jørgensen & Phillips have written their introductory book with the purpose of giving 
readers access to  “det store tværfaglige felt, som diskursanalysen I de sisdste tiår har 
                                                 
3 In the book Vad är religion (2011) Eva Hellman uses parts of Laclau & Mouffe’s and Fairclough’s theories of 
discourse to analyze the way the category of religion has been shaped and created throughout the history of 
European scholarship and academics. 
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utviklet seg til”4 (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 7). They stress the fact that the 
term “discourse” is often either used as a rather vague general term for the idea that 
language is structured in different patterns, or is precisely but variously defined in different 
theories according to what one wants to study. They therefore give a presentation of three 
different varieties of discourse analysis. These all share the assumption that the way we 
talk about the world shapes our understanding of it, in other words: that discourse not only 
represents but also creates and changes reality. The three different views on discourse they 
present are Laclau & Mouffe’s discourse theory, critical discourse analysis, mainly by 
Norman Fairclough, and discourse psychology (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 
9). These theories all aim “at udforske og kortlægge magtrelationer I samfundet”5 and are 
therefore viable tools to use to try to answer the research questions of this thesis. The 
discourse psychology they present deals with how individuals draw on different discourses 
strategically in different situations, and will not be used in this paper. Both Laclau & 
Mouffe’s and Fairclough’s theories however give useful tools and insights, and, as 
Jørgensen & Phillips suggests, I will use both of them to create a method for my project 
(Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 16).  
 Jørgensen & Phillips give some general premises for all the perspectives on 
discourse analysis they present. Firstly, discourse analysis has to be seen as both a theory 
and a method. They present it as a “package deal” with certain theoretical premises about 
language, and how it constructs society, and certain theoretical models and methodological 
guidelines for how to gain access to the field of study (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 
1999, p.12). The discourse analyses they present relay on certain presumptions from the 
field of social constructivism. As mentioned earlier, they view reality not as something 
external and objective that humans can then sense, but as “et product af vore måder at 
kategorisere verden på”6 (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 13) This also means 
that the ways people understand the world are always culturally and historically bound, 
and is shaped through social interactions. Further, this socially constructed worldview 
leads to concrete actions (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 14). In addition, the 
perspectives on discourse analysis Winther Jøregensen & Phillips present all share the idea 
                                                 
4 “the large interdisciplinary field, which discourse analysis has develop into over the last decades” In this thesis 
I am referring to this one Danish and several German works. When I site them I will give the English 
translation in footnotes, and all translations are my own. 
5 “studying and mapping power relations in society”.  
6 “a product of our ways of categorizing the world”.  
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from language philosophy that we always access reality through language, and that we only 
have access to the “external” material world through discourse. In other words, also the 
“external” world, or at least our understanding of it, relies on how it is given meaning 
through language. (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 16)   
 
 
The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
The main theoretical and methodic framework I will use is found in Ernesto Laclau & 
Chantal Mouffe’s book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy – Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (1985).  Laclau & Mouffe construe a theory of discourse dealing particularly with 
conflict, power-relations between discourses, and hegemony, by deconstructing earlier 
Marxist and structuralist theories. Their theory is devised with contemporary politics in 
mind, but my claim is that it works in any scenario where one is trying to grasp the 
importance of certain symbols or semantic clusters in the conflict of discourses.  It focuses 
on the ways in which changing the meaning of, or configurations of, key points of a 
discourse, can change, subvert, or establish a new discourse. Thus it gives me tools to 
examine how changing the meaning or the associations of semantic field of supernatural 
power can change discourses and power relations. The theory is also situated at a more 
abstract level, and never specifically deals with discourse as one specific text or 
conversation, but treats it as process of fixation and subversion of meaning in general. The 
theory has some lacking points however, which I will come back to, so on the suggestion 
of Jørgensen & Phillips, I will draw on some of Fairclough’s discourse analysis to try to 
bridge the gaps. 
 
The base for all of Laclau & Mouffe’s discourse theory, is that every part of society is 
“understood as a weave of meaning making processes” (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 
1999 p. 35).  There are no non-discursive practices because “every object is constituted as 
an object of discourse” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 107). The discursive formations are 
made up of objects in a system of differential positions, where the objects are given 
meaning through their relative positions to each other. These objects can be institutions, 
organization etc., in other words, every aspect of society gets it meaning by being part of 
a structure of relative positions. A concrete discourse occurs when elements, which can 
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have a variety of meaning, are given a specific meaning in a specific context, trough 
relating them to each other in specific ways. This process they call articulation: “we will 
call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity 
is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from 
the articulatory practice, we will call discourse” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 105). The 
elements gain meaning through the process of articulation, which relates them to other 
elements in such a way that they become a structured totality, and by this process of 
articulation, the elements become moments of the discourse. The moments are elements 
that have their meaning fixed through the process of articulation, which locks all the 
elements in place in one particular discourse. However, Laclau & Mouffe already stated 
that meaning is never fixed, so one specific discourse is also never fixed. This is because 
of something they call overdetermination. This key concept they take from Althusser, 
which again borrowed it from the disciplines of linguistics and psychoanalysis (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985, p. 97). The idea of overdetermination relies on linguistic theories who 
proclaim that signs get their meaning through being related to other signs. Because there 
is an abundance of signs one particular sign can be related to, there is always the possibility 
to give signs a new meaning. Since society according to Laclau & Mouffe’s consist of 
elements in the process of meaning making, the concept also applies to these elements, and 
thereby to all of society. This means that the fixation of elements into moments through 
articulation is never fully possible, “because the presence of some [objects] in the others 
hinders the suturing of the identity of any of them” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 104). In 
other words it is never possible for an element to have only one specific meaning, because 
it’s meaning will always be determined by what it is related to. There will always be “a 
‘surplus of meaning’ which subverts it” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 111)  in every 
element, in other words, it is overdetermined. This overdetermination comes about because 
every discursive practice is situated in the field of discursivity.  The field of discursivity is 
the field of all possible meanings an element could have, which are excluded when they 
are articulated as moments in a discourse (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 37). 
The field of discursivity is in other words a field of multiple practices of articulation, which 
all try to fixate the meaning of elements, and thereby simultaneously subvert their meaning   
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 111). In the process where different discourses try to establish 
themselves in the field of discursivity there are some privileged signs which Laclau and 
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Mouffe call nodal points. Nodal points are points of meaning which construct the center of 
a discourse, by being the moment that all other moments are related to. They constitute 
partially fixed points in the field of discursivity, because different discourses constitute 
them “as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences” 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 112). There is a second reason why meaning is never fully 
fixed. The articulation from elements into fully fixed moments is never possible because 
in the field of discursivity, every element is given meaning through its relations to other 
elements. Because elements never get their meaning in and of themselves, there will always 
be the meaning of the ‘Other’, which in turn can subvert it (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 
125). This implies that moments, at least partially, get their meaning through a relation to 
everything they are not. This negation is the second reason that moments in a discourse, 
and therefore the discourse as such, can never be fully fixed: the meaning of the moments 
emerges from them being constituted against something outside of the discourse. This limit 
of a discourse to ever establish fully fixed moments without relating them to something 
external to itself, is captured by Laclau & Mouffe’s term antagonism, which is “the 
‘experience’ of the limit of all objectivity” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 122). Antagonism 
is in their theory closely tied to the idea of relations of equivalence, and chains of 
equivalence. In a chain of equivalence, differential moments are identified with each other 
as being different that something else. The example Laclau & Mouffe give is of the 
colonizer: The colonizers difference in dress, language, habit etc. each stand in a 
differential position to the same elements of the colonized, and they become a chain of 
equivalence in all being signs of the colonizer.  This way they lose their differential 
relations to each other – dress, language and habits all become a sign of being “not 
colonized”, in other words they get their meaning through a negation, and this is exactly 
what an antagonism is (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 127-130). This leads to Laclau & 
Mouffe’s definition of hegemony. For there to be a hegemonic practice, which is a certain 
sort of articulatory practice, there needs to be an antagonism between two opposing forces, 
with unstable frontiers between them. The process of hegemonization is the process 
wherein there is an articulation of elements across several discursive formations, in such a 
way that the discourse is “expelling outside itself any surplus of meaning subverting it”. 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 137) As already explained, moments in a discourse can never 
be totally fixed, but hegemony is successful when the discursive formation, and the 
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opposing force which it is in an antagonistic relation to, take the fixed moment as a given. 
In Winter Jørgensen and Phillips words: “Den hegemoniske interventionen er lykkedes, 
hvis én diskurs igen alene dominerer dér, hvor der før var konflikt, og antagonismen 
dermed er opløst”7  (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 61).   
Laclau & Mouffe’s theory has been criticized for the fact that they claim everything 
is discourse, and this is a criticism I agree with. I will however use their ideas and terms 
about signs getting their meaning through being set in differential positions to each other, 
and some of their other ideas about meaning making, like nodal points, articulation, 
overdetermination, antagonism and hegemony. The question I still need to answer then, is 
how to change the meaning of signs, which are what I have access to through the articles 
on Sanskrit text I will be analyzing, can be part of, and shape power relations. To answer 
this, I will turn to Norman Fairclough’s discourse theory. 
 
 
Fairclough’s theory and method of discourse 
Norman Fairclough’s theory of and method for discourse analysis is found in the 
book Discourse and Social Change (1992). In the context of this thesis the most important 
parts of his theory are the theory of how discursive change can lead to change in relations 
of power, and the concept of interdiscursivity. These will explained be after I have given a 
general outline of the theory. Fairclough’s concept of discourse is informed both by 
linguistic discourse theory, and discourse theory from the social sciences, especially of 
Michel Foucault. He combines insights from both fields to create a theory of discourse, 
with emphasis on how discursive change relates to social and cultural change, and a method 
for discourse analysis to use on texts. He does this by developing a framework for discourse 
analysis with three dimensions; discourse as text, discursive practice and social practice. 
For the first dimension he uses Halliday’s definition of text, according to which text is 
every instance of spoken or written language, meaning discourse is always “manifested in 
linguistic form” (Fairclough, 1992 p. 71). The second dimension focuses on discursive 
practice, meaning the production, distribution and consumption of text. Discursive practice 
as social practice is the last dimension; discursive practice is always social, although there 
                                                 
7 “The hegemonic intervention is successful, if one discourse once more dominates, where there earlier was a 
conflict, and thereby dissolving the antagonism”. 
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are also social practices which are not discursive. This makes his theory and method 
suitable for analyzing which impact texts have on society and how they can contribute to 
social change.    
 The mediated nature of my sources implies that I can only draw an exploratory 
picture of the first layer of analysis. The second dimension will be discussed by putting the 
Sanskrit texts into context and asking, who wrote them, for which purpose, and what kind 
of impact the texts have had in the traditions they have been used. My analysis focuses on 
how ideas about supernatural powers were used in power conflicts, and for that task, insight 
gained from Laclau & Mouffe’s theory give concrete tools for analyzing how ideas about 
supernatural powers where part of the conflict in the text, while the framework of 
Fairclough third dimension, shows how discourse works as a social practice, and therefore, 
how it can change social practices, culture and power relations. 
 
 
Fairclough’s definition of discourse  
Fairclough proposes to use the term discourse to describe language as a form of 
social practice, and in this way both a way to act on the world and other people, and a mode 
of representation. He postulates a “dialectical relationship between discourse and social 
structure” where discourse constitutes and constructs social structure, while at the same 
time being shaped and constrained by it (Fairclough, 1992 p. 64). Discourse does this by 
constructing social identities, social relations between people, and systems of knowledge 
and belief. These three aspects correspond to what he calls the ‘identity’, ‘relational’ and 
‘ideational functions of language’. Together they form society, and through conventional 
and creative discursive practice, society can be reproduced or transformed (Fairclough, 
1992 p. 63f). 
 
 
Orders of discourse 
Fairclough follows French discourse analysts in claiming discursive events (any 
instance of discourse) rely on interdiscourse, rather than individual codes or conventions. 
“Interdiscourse is […] the structural entity which underlies discursive events, rather than 
the individual formation or code” (Fairclough, 1992 p. 68). This means that discursive 
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events are formed based on configurations of interdependent elements, e.g. by combining 
elements from two genres. This complexity also means that discursive events are not 
predictable, as is supposed when using the structuralist view where the discursive event is 
just an instantiation of the underlying codes and conventions. Fairclough uses Foucault’s 
term ‘order of discourse’ for this configuration of interdependent elements (codes or 
formations). He assumes that the relation between different elements in an order of 
discourse need not be complementary, but can also be contradictory. The character of the 
relations depends on social circumstances; boundaries between elements might seem 
complimentary or non-contradictory in some instances, but “become a focus of 
contestation and struggle, and the subject positions and the discursive practices associated 
with them might be experienced as contradictory” (Fairclough, 1992 p. 69). This not only 
applies to boundaries between elements of one order of discourse (e.g. classroom behavior 
and school yard behavior) but also between different orders of discourse (e.g. school and 
home). Contradictory relations might lead to a struggle for redefining boundaries or 
relations and/or extending properties between elements or orders of discourse, and such to 
a rearticulation of elements in an order of discourse or relations between orders of 
discourse in a society. The redrawing of boundaries can also constitute new elements 
(Fairclough, 1992 p. 70). In this way the articulation and rearticulation of discursive 
elements can be a factor in social change. 
Fairclough’s concept of “order of discourse” is not only a viable theoretical 
framework for how discursive practice can change society, but can also be used as an 
analytical category in combination with some of the terms from Laclau & Mouffe’s theory. 
Winter-Jørgensen & Phillips point out the shortcomings of the term “field of discursivity”, 
which Laclau & Mouffe use for all the meanings of an element that are excluded when they 
are articulated in a discourse. It is unclear however, if this means all the meanings an 
elements could theoretically have, or all the meanings that are ascribed to it by opposing 
discourses. They therefore suggest using Laclau & Mouffe’s term “field of discursivity” 
for the first instance, and Fairclough’s term “Order of discourse” for the second one, 






Discursive change as power struggles 
As explained above, social change might occur through change of discursive elements 
which again change the order of discourse and with it identities and social realities which 
are constituted by discourse. This change can come about, or effect changes in power 
relations between different groups, especially if the discourse is politically or ideologically 
invested. Fairclough defines ideologies as constructions of reality built into discursive 
practices, which “contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations 
of domination” (Fairclough, 1992 p. 87). Changing this type of ‘ideologically invested’ 
discursive practices can be a part of a restructuring of power relations, and this is often the 
case in instances where contradictory elements are found. Ideology can be part of codes 
and conventions which structure society, and through it discursive practice, but also of 
discursive practices who sustain or change the same structure. In other words, both social 
structure and discursive events can be ideologically invested through language. The 
ideological investment is most successful when naturalized, when the codes and 
conventions are an established part of social structures (Fairclough, 1992 p. 87-89). Since 
ideology is a part of shaping relations of power, ideologically invested discursive practice 
is also political.  “Discourse as a political practice establishes, sustains and changes power 
relations, and the collective entities […] between which power relations obtain” 
(Fairclough, 1992 s. 67). By naturalizing ideologically invested practices and invents, one 
also naturalizes power relations and make them more stable. Conversely, by changing or 
‘reinvesting’ ideologically discursive events or structures power relations are altered. This 




Fairclough bases his concept of interdiscursivity on Kristeva’s concept of intertextuality. 
Intertextuality describes how a text is always written and understood in the context of 
earlier, contemporary and later (by anticipation) texts, by describing, opposing, 
incorporating, modifying etc. them. Fairclough describes how French discourse analysts 
distinguish between ‘manifest’ and ‘constitutive’ intertextuality: Manifest intertextuality is 
when a text, explicitly or implicitly refers directly to another text, while constitutive 
intertextuality is how the text is shaped by discursive conventions (Fairclough, 1992 p. 
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104). Fairclough chooses, when distinguishing between the two types of intertextuality, to 
call the constitutive intertextuality ‘interdiscursivity’, and it is this term and concept I will 
use in my analysis. What is important for my analysis is that through drawing on different 
discursive conventions a text can be shaped by various elements or orders of discourses. If 
these elements or orders of discourse are in a contradictory relation, it leads to a text with 
contradictory or ambivalent meaning. In other words, a text can become a part of a power 




In this section, I will explain which of the terms and insights gained from the two theories 
presented above I will use as the basis for the analyses in the next chapters. The theoretical 
framework on how changing discourse can bring about concrete changes in society is 
mainly based on Fairclough’s theory presented above, and I will come back to it in chapter 
7. 
 
Terms from Laclau & Mouffe 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is primarily exactly that, a theory and not a method. 
Winther Jørgensen & Phillips therefore give some suggestion of how to use insight gained 
from said theory as tools for use in a concrete discourse analysis (Winther Jørgensen and 
Phillips, 1999, p. 63), some of which I will use. The notion of discourses as processes of 
articulation that try to fix a meaning by using nodal points as centers of meaning, seem 
useful. Winter Jørgensen & Phillips present Laclau’s later term of “floating signifiers” 
together with the idea of using nodal points for analysis. Floating signifiers are “elementer, 
der i særlig høy grad er åbne for forskjellige betydningstilskrivinger”8 (Winther Jørgensen 
and Phillips, 1999, p. 39). Nodal points are a type of floating signifiers; they serve as fixing 
points for a large variety of other elements, and are therefore easy to ascribe new meanings 
through relations to new elements. Here Winther Jørgensen & Phillips introduce another 
term coined by Lacan, which Laclau & Mouffe also reference in their theory (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985, p. 112). The nodal point serves as the fixing point of a “signifying chain”. 
The different elements in the signifying chain establish the meaning of the nodal point, but 
                                                 
8 “elements, which to a particularly high degree are open for different ascriptions of meaning”. 
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at the same time it delimits the meanings possible for the elements in it. To give an example, 
a nodal point in a discursive field about healthy living is “eating healthy”. This nodal point 
is a floating signifier, because only on itself, it does not have meaning. Only when put into 
a signifying chain with other elements, like low fat, low carb, organic food etc. does it get 
its meaning. Winther Jørgensen & Phillips also suggest using the terms of antagonism and 
hegemony to analyze conflicts. “Antagonisme oppstår, når forskjellige identiteter gensidigt 
forhindrer hinanden”9 (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 60). They therefore 
suggest studying how different perceptions of reality can become antagonistic in ascribing 
different meaning to the same elements, how the ‘Other’ is constructed as a response to an 
antagonism, and how and if there are hegemonic intervention which try to lock the 
elements into certain positions across the field of antagonism. (Winther Jørgensen and 
Phillips, 1999, p.64). All these different ways elements can be given meaning, and 
discourses can be constructed or changed, is something I will keep in mind when studying 
the articles who are my primary source material. E.g., I can try to ascertain if supernatural 
powers are nodal points in the discourses I am studying, if not,, what are the nodal points 
they are related to, how do those nodal points change their meaning when they are related 
to new elements, which other discourses are drawn into the order of discourse to implement 
an hegemonic intervention etc. In addition to these terms from Laclau & Mouffe, I will 













                                                 
9 “Antagonism occurs, when different identities mutually prevent each other”. 
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In this chapter, I am going to present use Malinar’s work on yoga powers in the 
Mahābhārata. She argues that yoga powers were an integral part of the ongoing discussion 
in the same work of how liberation works, and what liberation is. I will first present the 
four parts of the text she discusses, including her arguments and views about what they say 
on the relation between yoga powers and liberation. Then follows a description of some 
different conceptualizations of liberation found in the text Malinar discusses. In the last 
part of the chapter I will discuss the presented material in accordance with the method of 
discourse analysis presented in chapter 3.  
Angelika Malinar, Indologist with a special focus on Sāṃkhya, yoga powers, the 
Mahābhārata and the Bhagavadgītā has made the argument that yoga powers are 
fundamental to the understanding of liberation in certain parts of the Mahābhārata. In the 
article “Yoga Powers in the Mahābhārata” (2012) she discusses different depictions of 
yoga powers in some sections of the Mahābhārata. She has the same understanding of the 
term yoga powers as Jacobsen (see chapter one); she describes them as “extraordinary 
activities” […] which indicate successful yoga practice” (Malinar, 2012, p. 33) 
Furthermore she notes that there are numerous mentions of different types of beings who 
wield ‘yogic powers’ and they are “treated by the epic’s composers as ‘common 
knowledge’ on the part of the audience” (Malinar, 2012 p. 33). The supernatural powers 
gained through yoga practice are described by various terms like bala, aiśvarya, vibhūti, 
vīrya, prabhāva and yoga. Her article looks at different parts of the Mahābhārata that deal 
with the exposition of these types of power in relation to yoga practice to reach liberation. 
The purpose of her article is to show that the depictions of yoga powers are not “remnants 
of ‘archaic magical thinking’ ”, but, at least in the part of the text here described, were an 
integral part of the exposition on how liberation was achievable through yogic practice 
(Malinar, 2012 p. 34). The parts of the text she discusses is the story about Śuka, two 
didactic chapters on yoga (chapters 12.289 and 12.228) and the treatment of yoga in the 
Bhagavadgītā. These sections show a differing view on how yoga powers were acquired, 
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and for what, if at all, they should be used. Malinar ascribes this to the emergence of the 
theistic Hindu traditions and the philosophical system of Yoga and Sāṃkhya in the time of 
the Mahābhārata was written. These sought to give a logical/metaphysical explanation for 
the yoga powers and incorporated them into their soteriology. In the last part of the chapter 
I want to show that it is possible, on the background of Malinar’s discussion, to identify 
the yoga powers as being part of a discourse about the right means to salvation, and how 




The Mahābhārata is an Indian epic, originally a collection of bardic poems about heroic 
feats, which later incorporated other types of texts, like philosophical and theological 
expositions and didactic parts. The epic is reckoned as being assembled between the 5th 
century BCE – 4th century CE. The bardic poems were originally composed for use in the 
royal courts of the Kṣatriyas and transmitted orally, but were written down by Brahmins 
around the 1st century CE. The frame story of the book is about two branches of a royal 
family, the Kauravas and the Pāṇḍavas, and their battle for the Kuru kingdom. The most 
known part of the epic, the Bhagavadgītā, depicts the Pāṇḍavas’ foremost warrior, Arjuna 
and his charioteer, who is Kṛṣṇa in disguise, standing on the field of battle right before it 
begins. At this moment Arjuna has doubts about participating in the war. Kṛṣṇa reveals 
himself to Arjuna, and they have a long conversation about dharma, how to live life the 
right way, and the best ways to achieve salvation. In short, Kṛṣṇa shows himself to be the 
supreme deity, ruler and creator of cosmos, and states that the best way to achieve 
liberation is performing your duties according to varṇāśramadharma as worship to Kṛṣṇa, 
even though he does not disclaim that other methods also have a possibility of leading to 
salvation. The Bhagavadgītā  ends with Arjuna appeased that it is his duty to go to war 
with his cousins, and that it therefore will have no karmic repercussions for him 





A note on primary sources 
Finding an English translation of the Bhagavadgītā was no problem and I will use the 
translation by Gavin Flood and Charles Martin The Bhagavad Gita (2012). When trying to 
find a translated version of book 12 of the Mahābhārata however, proved to be more 
problematic. There have been recent publications of the translated version of the 
Mahābhārata, most notably University of Chicago Press’ series The Mahābhārata (1973) 
begun by Jan van Buitenen, and the translations by various scholars in the Clay Sanskrit 
Library series Mahābhārata published by New York University Press and begun in 2005. 
None of these however, have published part two of book 12 of the Mahābhārata, which is 
where Malinar gets the rest of her material. The only translated version of this part 
accessible to me is the translation by Kesari Mohan Ganguli (under the name of P. C. Roy) 
published 1883-96 in Calcutta by Bhārata Press. This is a translation of the full work, and 
is easily accessible as an open source file on the Internet. Van Buitenen notes that this was 
the latest full English translation when he stared his work (Buitenen, 1973, p. xxxvi). He 
further comments that “The reader […] may protest many renderings, but still recognize 
that the attempt was a scholarly one. I have consulted it often” (Buitenen, 1973, p. xxxvii). 
I understand this to mean that there are faults in it, but not so many as to make it worthless, 
so I have decided to use it, with caution. In addition to being a possibly faulty translation, 
Ganguli’s version is also based on a different recension of manuscripts than Malinar uses; 
Ganguli’s translation being based on the Bombay edition from 1863, while Malinar uses 
the critical edition by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute at Poona completed in 
1970 (Buitenen, 1973, s. xxxf) Since I cannot know how correct this rendering is, and how 
different it is from the critical edition, this chapter is mostly based on Malinar’s 
understanding of the different instances in the Mahābhārata, while I have consulted the 
translation of Ganguli as much as possible. 
 
 
The story of Śuka 
Malinar explains that the story about the miraculously born sage Śuka and his quest to 
attain liberation is a well-studied story of the Mahābhārata. Her aim however, is to shine 
a light on the role of Śuka’s yoga powers in attaining this goal, which she states have been 
given little notice to by earlier scholars. The story begins when the epic’s supposed 
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composer Vyāsa, wishing for a son with extraordinary capabilities, having “the puissance 
of Fire and Earth an Water and Wind and Space” (Roy, 1891, p. 693) (i. e. mastering all 
the elements) practices tapas (austerities), and Śiva grants him his wish.10 Vyāsa, having 
seen a beautiful apsarā  (a heavenly female being in Indian tradition) spills his seed on the 
sticks he is using to light is fire, and “it was thus that that great ascetic, that foremost of 
Rishis and highest of Yogins, took his birth from the two sticks” (Roy, 1891, p. 695).  Śuka 
expresses his wish to learn more about the attainment of liberation, and is father tells him 
to travel to king Janaka for instruction Śuka comes before Janaka as a Brahmin pupil 
seeking instruction. After getting this he returns to his father where he practices Vedic 
recitations and “is lectured by Nārada on the misery of life” (Malinar, 2012 p. 36). 
Following this he decides to attain the final liberation, which is going to “the place of non-
return”, in this story identified as the sun: “Hence, I desire to go into the Sun of blazing 
effulgence. There I shall live, invincible by all, and in my inner soul freed from all fear, 
having cast of this body of mine in the solar region” (Roy, 1891, p. 732) Śuka states that 
the only way to reach this place requires the practice of yoga. Setting upon the part for the 
place of non-return, he first leaves his father and travels to a mountaintop where he 
practices yoga and becomes “a ‘mighty lord among yogins’” (Malinar, 2012 p. 37) 11. 
Having become a master of yoga he flies upwards into the sky to the sage Nārada and 
performs a circumambulation of him in the air as a sign of respect. Thereafter he “once 
more set himself to Yoga and entered the element of space. Ascending then from the breast 
of the Kailāsa mountain, he soared into the sky” (Roy, 1891, p. 734) and through ever 
higher levels of the cosmos and casts of the three guṇas tamas, rajas,  and sattva, and 
reaches the realm of brahma. Malinar states that it in this text means the realm of the 
nonmanifest prakṛti, the final realm from where the yogin reaches final liberation (Malinar, 
2012 p. 39). Here he displays his yogic powers for the last time, before traveling beyond 
                                                 
10 Malinar refers to Mhb 12.309-320 when referring to the story of Suka. Because the translation of the work I 
am using is based on a different edition, the chapter numbers in it are not the same as the ones Malinar uses. E.g. 
the story of Śuka is here relied in chapters 324-334.The concordance between the critical edition and the 
Bomaby edition can be found in Buitenen’s The Mahābhārata -I:The Beginning (1973, p. 475-478) and i have 
used this to find the corresponding chapters in Ganguli’s translation. To avoid confusion, i will refer to the 
citations from Ganguli with page numbers. 
11 Malinar in this article uses the designation «yogin» for one who is accomplished in yoga practice. Other 
authors use various spellings for this term, e.g. Rastelli uses «yogin» and Burchett uses «yogī». Other spellings i 
have encountered are «yogi» and «yogīn». I will follow Malinar and use «yogin». 
39 
 
the final mountain range, and into the highest abode, which is the sun, the place of non-
return. 
In Malinar’s analysis of the story of Śuka, the crucial point for this study is that 
Śuka uses the yoga powers on his quest for liberation, but is discouraged of using them at 
any other point. Malinar points out that it is mentioned twice how Śuka traveled to Janaka 
by foot because using his yogic powers to fly would have been and indulgence of pleasure 
and pride. Malinar further points out that this shows how having these powers and being a 
mahāyogin ‘mighty yogin’ is not enough for being a ‘true’ yogin (she is here probably 
alluding to the idea that a ‘true’ yogin is one who can reach liberation), and that not 
indulging in these powers is a sign of being on the way to becoming one. Śuka is born as a 
mighty yogin with powers over the element that gives him the ability to fly etc. Malinar 
notes that this still does not qualify him as what she calls a “true” yogin, because he still 
seeks instruction from both king Janaka and the renowned sage Nārada (Malinar, 2012 p. 
36). When he arrives at the final destination before liberation, the world of brahma, he is 
also said to attain new powers, being omnipresent, facing all directions and being the All 
(Malinar, 2012 p. 39). The point when Śuka uses his powers first comes on his quest to 
liberation, when they “serve their purpose in providing strength and mastery over the 
elements that are deemed necessary in order to leave the world and the body behind” 
(Malinar, 2012 p. 37). 
 
 
Chapter 12.289 in the Mahābhārata 
Malinar explains Chapter 12.289, (along with 12.290) in the Mahābharata as being about 
the differences between Yoga and Sāṃkhya which are described as “philosophical or 
metaphysical doctrines” (Malinar, 2012 p. 41) concerned with the question of how to attain 
liberation. She emphasizes that this portion of the text states that while they have many 
similarities, the main difference is that the Sāṃkhya doctrine was attained through 
transmitted knowledge while the yogins come by the truth through (extraordinary) 
perception. The outcome is that those who practice Sāṃkhya attain liberation through the 
realization that the self is not identical to matter, while yogins control said matter through 
powers acquired through their yogic practice. She also points out that the latter would be 
the case in Śuka’s liberation. Malinar explains that the Sāṃkhya doctrine teaches how to 
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attain liberation through detachment from the sense-objects while the yogin gains control 
over sense/objects and as such can “turn to the realms of objects as he pleases or turn away 
from them forever” (Malinar, 2012 p. 43). The Ganguli translations on this questions reads 
“The evidences of Yoga are addressed by the ken of the senses; those of the Sānkhya are 
based on the scriptures” (Roy, 1891, p. 570). Scriptures here refers to the transmitted 
knowledge that is necessary for liberation in the Sāṃkhya system, while the “ken of the 
senses” refers to the learned mastery of the senses the yogin has to develop to reach the 
same goal. Malinar further explains how the yogin, through being in control of all objects, 
attains various supernatural abilities, like multiplying himself and taking control of other 
beings bodies. He is immortal, “in control of his own liberation” (Malinar, 2012 p. 43) and 
rules the forces of creativity.  In the Ganguli translation we can read that  
 
The Yogin, when grown in strength, burning with energy, and possessed of might, is 
capable of scorching the entire Universe like the Sun that rises at the time of universal 
dissolution. […] Independent of all things, Yogins, endued with Yoga-puissance and 
invested with lordship, enter into (the hearts of) the very lords of creation, the Rishis, the 
deities, and the great Beings in the universe. Neither Yama, nor the Destroyer, nor Death 
himself of terrible prowess, when angry, ever succeeds in prevailing over the Yogin, O 
king, who is possessed of immeasurable energy. The Yogin, acquiring Yoga-puissance, can 
create thousands of bodies and with them wandereth over the Earth. […] The Yogin, who 
is possessed of strength, and whom bonds bind not, certainly succeeds in attaining to 
Emancipation. (Roy, 1891, p. 572) 
 
Malinar points out that the yogin here is equated to a god, and that it is this status of being 
and īśvara (lord, powerful master) which gives him the power over his own liberation. The 
yoga powers which in this chapter are described as being acquired through yoga practice 
are therefore necessary if one wishes to attain liberation, and Malinar claims they are the 
goal of yoga (unlike Sāṃkhya) as presented in chapter 12.289 (Malinar, 2012 p. 41). In 
this chapter, no Sāṃkhya terminology is used, and Malinar claims this is probably done 
deliberately, since the topic of the chapter (and the next one) is the difference between 
Sāṃkhya and yoga. (Malinar, 2012, p. 44) In this, and in the assertion that the yoga powers 
help attain liberation, it is similar to the story of Śuka. A difference however, is that Śuka 
only uses his powers once, and then leaves them behind, while the yogis in this chapter can 
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use them as they please, and this is the state of liberation. He controls all objects, and can 
enter, create or leave bodies as he pleases, and is free from bodily restriction. This power 
allows him to exist without a physical body, yet at the same time create or control as many 
as he pleases, and he is equated to a god, because he “is active and inactive at the same 
time, […] he is liberated from physical existence, yet assumes all kinds of bodies” 
(Malinar, 2012, p.44). This state, which is without death, birth, pain and pleasure, is the 
state of liberation.  
 
 
Chapter 12.228 in the Mahābhārata 
The topic of chapter 12.228 in the Mahābhārata is the acquirement of yoga powers, and 
these are explained within the Sāṃkhya framework of the tattvas. The method for doing 
this Malinar explains, is through a fixation of the mind, which gives control over the senses 
(Malinar, 2012 p. 45). Through this practice the yogin gradually gains control over the 
different tattvas, beginning with the five elements, then the ego-consciousness and the 
buddhi, and at last the nonmanifest matter, avyakta (See chapter 2). This mastery bestows 
upon him many supernatural abilities, like creating creatures form his own body, making 
the earth tremble, disappear at will, omnipotence, and perfect knowledge. (Roy, 1891, p. 
259) We can read in Ganguli’s translation that “the Yogin gradually acquires mastery over 
Earth, Wind, Space, Water, Fire, Consciousness, and Understanding. After this he 
gradually acquires mastery over the Unmanifest” (Roy, 1891, p. 258). This “Unmanifest” 
is the avyakta prakṛti, and upon reaching this the yogin can cast away his gross body.  
Malinar expounds on this saying that the yogin, having reached the state where he can 
control avyakta, the nonmanifest state of all creation, is liberated from his body. He exists 
only in a subtle form, can control the unmanifest matter as it is before creation, and is 
therefore likened to the creator god Prajāpati. Yogic power is in this chapter conceptualized 
as controlling the avyakta prakṛti. Even though the yogin in this state no longer needs a 
body, he still has not reached the final liberation. To do this he has to leave the realm of 
avyakta prakṛti behind. (Malinar, 2012 p. 46) We see here yet another function of the yoga 
powers in the quest for liberation. In chapter 12.289, liberation is the state of having yogic 
power, in the story of Śuka, he has to use yoga powers to reach the place of liberation, 
while in this chapter, the powers are something that the yogin will inevitably acquire when 
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he reaches the realm of the unmanifest. That place is, similar as in the story of Śuka, the 
final stepping-stone to liberation, however, in this instance no yogic powers are needed to 
take that final step. Malinar points out that this idea of the yogic powers being something 
that has to be overcome rather than used, is in alignment with the commentarial traditions 
of the Yogasūtra and the Sāṃhyakhārikā (Malinar, 2012, p. 47). She also points out that 
the word used to describe this state of control of the avyakta is aiśvarya, “which suggests 
its terminological use as attested in later systematized presentations in commentaries on 
YS and SK” (Malinar, 2012 p. 45). This is significant because these commentaries try to 
explain away or overlook the fact that the Yogasūtra gives a great amount of space to the 
treatment of the 8 aiśvaryas12 and treat them as mere unwanted byproducts.  
 
 
Yoga Powers in the Bhagavadgītā 
Malinar also writes about how the idea about Yoga Powers in a Sāṃkhya framework is 
used to explain Kṛṣṇa’s power as the supreme deity in the Bhagavadgītā. In this part of the 
Mahābhārata he reveals himself to be the all-transcendent being, who at the same time 
appears as a human manifestation on earth. He also teaches Arjuna that there are several 
ways to liberation The easiest of these, and the one he urges Arjuna to pursue, he explains, 
is the way of bhakti:  “But those who yield all acts to me, intent on me as the highest, and 
worship me […] I will redeem” Kṛṣṇa explains that if one surrenders to him as the supreme 
deity, and does every action as a sacrifice to him, he will grace one with the gift of 
deliverance from the never-ending cycle of rebirths. Malinar points out two functions that 
yoga powers have in the discussions in this part of the Mahābhārata. The first of these 
explain how yogins in general, and Kṛṣṇa specifically, can perform actions without karmic 
repercussion, and the second how Kṛṣṇa is conceptualized as a transcendent being superior 
to all the other gods.   
 In the first case, there is a discussion in the 5th chapter of the Bhagavadgītā about 
how yogins can attain the state where they have achieved the yogic powers, and can use 
them without generating new karma, and thereby be in a state of semi-liberation, which 
turns into a full liberation when they die. The explanation of this in the Bhagavadgītā comes 
about by using the framework of Sāṃkhya. The texts states that the yogin attains yogic 
                                                 
12 These are the powers listed in the vibhūti section of the Yogasūtra, see chapter 1. 
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power by reaching a state where he has “conquered creation” through the realm of the 
unmanifested matter (avyakta prakṛti) and freely controls it (Malinar, 2012, p. 48) Because 
he has given up his body and his sense faculties, and is in the knowledge that it is not him 
who acts, but the guṇas, the power of creation itself, which he can direct as he pleases, he 
does not gain karmic repercussions. This is because only the self acting through the sense 
objects acquires karma, while prakṛti does not. This realm of the unmanifest that one can 
reach is also called prakṛtilaya, and this state was in some yoga and Sāṃkhya traditions 
seen as the final place of liberation (more on this later), but here it is explained as the final 
place in life, from where liberation is attained when the yogin dies. The state of the 
conquered realm of creation is here to be seen as a transitional stage (Malinar, 2012, p. 50). 
Malinar points out how similar ideas are also shown in the story of Śuka.  
 The second thing Malinar discusses is how this aforementioned idea about yogic 
powers being the power to control the avyakta prakṛti without acquiring karma, is the basis 
for the exposition of Kṛṣṇa as the supreme being, because his powers are explained as yoga 
powers. In the Bhagavadgītā Kṛṣṇa is said to be a being both transcendent and immanent 
in the world at the same time, all of the universe resides in him, but he is more than the 
universe. As Kṛṣṇa explains to Arjuna  in Bhg 9:4 “This universe is filled with me, with 
my unmanifested form; all beings here abide in me, but I do not abide in them” (Flood and 
Martin, 2012, p. 45)  Malinar shows how this apparent paradox can be explained through 
the idea of yogic powers as manipulating the unmanifest prakṛti: because everything is 
made of prakṛti, which Kṛṣṇa controls, everything is part of him, but at the same time his 
self is outside of the realm of prakṛti. This also lets him manifest himself as a human, which 
is his role in the rest of the Mahābhārata, and act in the world without gaining karma, it is 
because the manifestations are not his true self, they are bodies created out of the avyakta 
prakṛti (Malinar, 2012, p. 50f). In this way Kṛṣṇa is conceptualized as the supreme God, 




Before analyzing the different ways of reaching salvation in the parts of the Mahābharata 
Malinar has discussed, and how yoga powers relate to them, I will give an overview of the 
different types of salvation that are described or hinted at in the different texts. These are: 
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The doctrine of classical Sāṃkhya and classical Yoga that liberation occurs when puruṣa 
is realized as different from the mind-body-complex, the “proto-Sāṃkhya” practice of 
reaching the realm of the unmanifest (avyakta prakṛti) which equals salvation, and lastly 
the depiction of the sun as the final place one had to reach to gain salvation. These different 
ideas about what constitutes salvation will be relevant in the later analysis The notion of 
liberation in bhakti traditions, which claim that liberation is achieved through complete 
devotion to the supreme deity, in the Bhagavadgītā identified as Kṛṣṇa, has already been 
mentioned in chapter 2. 
 
 
Liberation in classical Sāṃkhya and classical Yoga 
As explained in chapter 2 the way to attain liberation according to the teachings of classical 
Sāṃkhya and classical Yoga, is by realizing puruṣa, the self, as independent from the body-
mind-complex, which is a product of prakṛti. This was to be done by a series of meditations 
and other practices which enhanced the sattvic property of the buddhi, so that the buddhi 
could see clearly and see the difference between ahamkara, buddhi and puruṣa. If this was 
achieved, the individual would realize the mistaken belief that puruṣa is bound to the 
prakṛti (i.e. the body and mind) to be false, and the puruṣa, and the body and mind would 
fall away from the puruṣa and such liberation was attained. In other Sāmhkya traditions, 
this was done through meditation starting on the lowest (or highest) tattva,, gross matter, 
until gaining control over it (through realization?). This was subsequently done with all the 
tattvas, until the point where you could control the buddhi, and discriminate between 




In the monography Prakṛti in Sāṃkhya-Yoga – Material Principle, Religious Experience, 
Ethical Implications (1999) Knut A. Jacobsen traces the different meanings and 
development of the category of prakṛti in Indian thought through various textual sources. 
In this endeavor, he also discusses the concept of prakṛtilaya, which he translates as 
“merging with prakṛti” (Jacobsen, 1999 p. 374). This concept is discussed in both the 
schools of classical Sāṃkhya and classical Yoga, where it is treated as a different, although 
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impermanent type of mokṣa (liberation) (Jacobsen, 1999 p. 274). As told before, the 
preferred way to liberation in these systems is to realize puruṣa as different from prakṛti, 
which is done through meditational practices which give knowledge of the tattvas. The 
state of prakṛtilaya happens if a yogin or sāṃkhya ‘one who adheres to Sāṃkhya’ manages 
to realize the 24th principle, the avyakta prakṛti and dissolve the buddhi into it, without 
gaining the discerning knowledge of puruṣa as different from prakṛti (Jacobsen, 1999 p. 
274f). “The attainment of the dissolution of the products of prakṛti into prakṛti without 
knowledge of the puruṣa principle leads to prakṛtilaya” (Jacobsen, 1999 p. 275). This 
brings the yogin/sāṃkhya to a state where he merges with the avyakta, and gains control 
over it, and the body and mind, including the buddhi are dissolved into the unmanifest 
material principle. This leads to liberation from saṃsāra, which according to these systems 
also is a manifestation of prakṛti, and this way mokṣa is attained (Jacobsen, 1999 p. 287). 
However, the puruṣa is still not free, because it is still bound to the avyakta prakṛti, as long 
as there has been no realization of the second ultimate principle, which is puruṣa.  This 
leads to an impermanent mokṣa, where the yogin/sāṃkhya will reside in avyakta prakṛti, a 
state which is described as mokṣa, until the destruction of cosmos and creation of the new 
one, where he will be reborn once again, as a god according to some commentaries 
(Jacobsen, 1999 p. 277). 
 Jacobsen argues that this description of prakṛtilaya as an impermanent, and 
therefore not as good, kind of liberation was a way of assimilating different views of 
liberation into one system, while still maintaining the view of one tradition as the ultimate 
one. This practice of incorporating claims of rival groups while still subsuming them is 
“comparable to the common pattern of interpretation of religious claims of competing 
groups in South Asia” (Jacobsen, 1999 p. 301). This was to create a hierarchy of more or 
less valid doctrines, with the emic doctrine always at the top as the most valid. However, 
Jacobsen also claims that there are in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts “references to some 
who believed prakṛti to be the final goal of their practice and the state they attained”  
(Jacobsen, 1999 p. 273). Jacobsen relays how prakṛtilaya is described as a state which is 
desired, and that also this desire has to be renounced if the yogin wants to achieve complete 
detachment which is necessary for the realization of the separateness of puruṣa. He also 
cites a statement for Vācaspatimiśra commenting on the Vyāsabhāṣya, which refers to 
persons who are resolved into primary-matter and worship it, and how one has to rid 
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himself of this desire. Jacobsen suggests that “This denouncement of prakṛtilaya means 
probably that the experience of merging in materiality was something some individuals 
were attached to and attempted to achieve” (Jacobsen, 1999 p. 279), and that these held 
prakṛti as the ultimate principle and prakṛtilaya as the ultimate experience. He further 
argues that prakṛtilaya probably was the ultimate goal for the Yoga and Sāṃkhya traditions 
which divided the world into 24 tattvas, excluding puruṣa, and such had only prakṛti as an 
ultimate principle. He further notes that such a belief is attested in the Mahābhārata, where 
there are references to Sāṃkhya school accepting 24, 25 and 26 principles of reality 
(Jacobsen, 1999 p. 279f). This schools had different views of the ultimate principle, and 
“The final goal of those who believed the twenty-fourth principle to be the ultimate, seems 
to have been the realization of the dissolution of the mind into prakṛti, annihilation of 
individuality, and freedom from rebirth” (Jacobsen, 1999 p. 280). As is made clear, there 
was a belief interpreted in Sāṃkhya terms, in prakṛti as the ultimate principle and source 
of liberation, and traces of this belief are found in some parts of the Mahābhārata.  
 
 
Yoking the chariot to pierce the disk of the sun 
White states that before the epic period, which he sets at ca. 200BC – 400CE (White, 2009, 
p. 60), the root yuj and its derivate yoga had two specific meanings: “the yoking of a 
wheeled conveyance to a draft animal and, by extension, the linkage between a visionary 
thinker’s mind or consciousness to some transcendent object” (White, 2009, p. 60) In both 
cases the yoking enables travels outwards or upwards. Closely tied to the concept of yoking 
in the first meaning is the idea of traveling to the sun. This idea appeared already in the 
Vedas, where the afterlife was attained by “traveling to or through the sun on a ritually 
constructed chariot” (White, 2009, p. 61). The chariot, or sometimes boat, was the sacrifice 
itself, and the patron of the sacrifice was yoked to it, every timed he sacrificed. This enabled 
him (his initiation body that is, while his mundane body stayed behind) to ascend to the 
heavenly world, its gate being the disk of the sun, before descending to this world again 
once the sacrifice was over. This was repeated daily, so that when he died, the sacrifice of 
his cremated body would be the chariot that carried him to heaven where he would now 
stay permanently. In addition to the patron being yoked to the sacrifice,  (White, 2009, 
p.61f) White notes that “the most common rigvedic meaning of the verb *yuj […] was “to 
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yoke one’s self to a chariot” and by extension, “to prepare for battle.”” (White, 2009, p. 
63). The yoga was here the rig of the warrior who went to, or prepared for war. In later 
texts the chariot of the warrior could take on the same meaning of piercing the disk of the 
sun as the chariot of sacrifice for the patron. This is seen in the epics, where there are 
several accounts of warrior dying on the battlefield, who are then yoked to the sacrifice of 
their own death, which enables them to pierce the disk of the sun and enter the realms of 
the gods. The chariot is sometimes also said to be the sun’s rays, which descend and the 
warrior is yoked to (White, 2009, p. 67). 
The other meaning points to the practice of Vedic priests who were said to yoke their mind 
to poetic inspiration, which allowed them to join the world of sacrifice to the heavenly 
realm they were trying to reach through it (White, 2009, p. 63). In this way they linked the 
human and divine worlds, and were able to undertake “visionary expeditions to the furthest 




When analyzing how the yoga powers may change power relations in the instances 
mentioned by Malinar, I aim to identify the nodal points in the discourse and how yoga 
powers are related to them. There are 4 different ways in which a change in yoga powers 
and its relation to a nodal point can lead to a change in the discourse, and I will list these 
here before trying to identify what is the case in each of the parts of the Mahābhārata 
Malinar has studied. The four different ways are: to 
 
1. Change the meaning of the yoga powers as a nodal point 
2. Change the meaning of the yoga powers to or from a nodal point 
3. Change the meaning of a nodal point to which yoga powers stand in a chain of 
meaning 





When trying to analyze the cases, I first have to try and identify the nodal points of the 
discourse, the meaning chains, and how they have changed or differ from other instances 
of discourse.  
 
 
Śuka’s story analysis 
Malinar identifies “the overall theme” (Malinar, 2012, p. 35) of the story of Śuka as being 
the quest for liberation. This is what Śuka strives for from the moment he is born, it is what 
the story leads to, and it is also explained and expounded on in the story. In other words, it 
is fair to say that in the instance of discourse this story makes, liberation is a nodal point, 
which the other discursive elements are related to. In the story, liberation is presented as 
the act of piercing the disk of the sun, by flying through it, and here we can see the older 
idea of liberation from Vedic times. In those instances, the sun was reached through 
sacrifice, battle or poetic inspiration, but in this story Śuka reaches the sun through various 
yogic means, not least among them the powers he has from birth, and the powers he gains 
from doing yoga. The nodal point which is liberation, here linked to traveling to the sun, 
is related to yogic practice and yogic power, both of the inborn and of the acquired variety. 
Even though Śuka in the end uses the yoga powers to gain liberation, it is also stressed that 
they are not to be used for anything else than this. In this way, the story both correlates and 
contradicts the commentaries on the Yogasūtra where it is stated that the yogin will acquire 
yoga powers but is not to use them since they will lead him away from the path of 
liberation. Śuka is told by his father to not use these powers since they will lead him away 
from his path, however at the moment he sets out for the “final push” for liberation, it is 
the yoga powers that help him attain it. In this story, we can therefore see elements of 
various discourses, all tied to the nodal point of liberation, which attest to the many various 
traditions which all claimed the superior way to liberation.   
 
 
Chapter 12.289 analysis 
As described above, this chapter is about the differences between how practitioners of 
Yoga and Sāṃkhya realize the goal of liberation, and Malinar emphasizes how important 
yoga powers are for that goal. She points out that it is probably deliberately described 
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without relying on the Sāṃkhya metaphysical framework, to highlight the differences 
between the two systems. In this chapter of the Mahābhārata, the nodal point, or at least a 
nodal point, is still liberation, only here liberation gets another meaning than in the story 
of Śuka. Liberation in the story of Śuka is going to a point in or through the sun, while in 
this chapter it is described as living as one wishes in the immediate world, without any 
bonds, with incredible powers, in a godlike state of being. One could say that the yoga 
powers in this chapter are not just given meaning as an element in the meaning chain of 
liberation, rather that yoga powers are equated with liberation, such giving this nodal point 
a new meaning. This idea that a godlike state they give is considered the goal of religious 
practice can also be seen in certain early Śaiva traditions like the Pāśupatas and early Śaiva 
Siddhānta (more on this in chapter 7).  
In this chapter, we can also see what Laclau & Mouffe have called an antagonistic 
border, and an attempt at hegemonization. The author(s) of chapter 12.289 draw a clear 
line between Sāṃkhya and Yoga (even while acknowledging their similarities), and thus 
create an antagonism between the two; Yoga is explained through it difference from 
Sāṃkhya. This is even more clear with the statement from Malinar that it is carefully not 
explained with a Sāṃkhya terminology. All together it seems that attaining liberation 
through Yoga is not only described as different, but also as better than attaining it through 
the Sāṃkhya method. It is a total achievement of liberation, like one would get through the 
Sāṃkhya method as well, but in addition the yogin would get immense powers, and the 
ability to turn to or away from the material world as he pleases. The author(s) therefore try 
to establish the Yoga method as superior by using a hegemonic intervention and try to 
establish the meaning of elements of the discourse of both Yoga and Sāṃkhya in a way 
that favors the Yoga system. 
 
 
Chapter 12.228 analysis 
This chapter, unlike the last one, explains yoga powers within a Sāṃkhya framework. The 
nodal point is again liberation, and yoga powers are again attained on the way to it, but 
here they have to be given up, not used, to gain liberation. The element of yoga powers is 
in other words related to the nodal point almost as a negation, and is devalued through its 
relation to the nodal point. In this instance of the Mahābhārata we also see elements from 
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other discourses drawn in, namely the notion of prakṛtilaya and the idea of yoga powers as 
an unwanted side effect gained on the way to liberation. The latter idea is found in the 
commentaries on the Yogasūtra “which denies that attaining such powers is the goal of 
yoga, describing them instead as simple signs that certain yoga practices have been 
perfected and warning that they can distract from the ultimate salvific goal of yoga” 
(Jacobsen, 2005, p. 7). In the same textual instance the authors also denounce the state of 
prakṛtilaya, which as stated above was considered the ultimate goal and state of liberation 
by some Sāṃkhya traditions.  
As I see it, this is again an example of a process of hegemonization. The author(s) 
of the text here use the Sāṃkhya framework to denounce both the ideas of prakṛtilaya and 
the state as a powerful yogin who is a master of yoga powers as being a state of liberation. 
This they do by appropriating those discourses and relating their elements to their own key 
nodal point (that liberation is the disassociation of puruṣa with prakṛti) and in that way 




In the Bhagavadgītā we see the yoga powers in a Bhakti discourse, more specifically in 
relation to the idea of karma and liberation, and in relation to Kṛṣṇa as the supreme being. 
In the first case, liberation is still the nodal point of the discourse, however this is the only 
one of the abovementioned instances where karma is an element of the discourse, and the 
yoga powers are used as a counterforce to the element of karma which otherwise 
undermines the idea of a yogin being able to act without karmic retribution. Here the 
element of karma has entered the discourse of the yogin living while controlling the sense 
objects. To hinder this idea of karma to negate the key element of liberation-in-life, karma 
is related to the idea of avyakta prakṛti in such a way that it does not end up unbalancing 
the whole discourse. 
 In the second part of the Bhagavadgītā Malinar discusses, the yoga powers, and the 
idea of controlling avyakta prakṛti through them have become part of a Bhakti discourse 
that has the supreme being, which in this instance is Kṛṣṇa, as its nodal point. The element 
of yoga powers are here related to the nodal point in such a way that Kṛṣṇa can be explained 
as superior to all other gods and beings, and we here once again see them as a part of 
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process of hegemonization where one tradition, namely Vaiṣṇava Bhakti, claims 
superiority over other traditions. The difference here is that the yoga powers are used to 
explain a god’s superiority instead of being directly related to the idea of liberation or 




































In the article “The religious practice of the sādhaka according to the Jayākhyasaṃhitā” 
(2000) Marion Rastelli describes the religious duties of the sādhaka prescribed by the 
Jayākhyasaṃhitā, which was an important text in the Vaiṣṇava Pāñcarātra tradition. 
Rastelli is an Indologist, currently working at the Institut für Kultur- und Gesitesgeschichte 
Asiens at the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaft. Her special field is the 
Pāñcarātra tradition, and especially the Pāñcarātra text Jayākhyasaṃhitā. In the 
monography Philosophisch-theologishe Grundanschaungen der Jayākhyasaṃhitā (1999) 
she describes the lack of study on the Pāñcarātra tradition, highlighting how out of the 
traditions’ many texts, only the Lakṣmītantra and small excerpts of a few others have been 
translated and systematically studied. Her own monography is described as an attempt to 
start rectifying this, as it is an extensive summary and analysis of the Jayākhyasaṃhitā, her 
focus being a description of the philosophical and theological base of the text, with a full 
translation of some of the earlier chapters of it. In addition, she has also written the 
aforementioned article about the ritual practices of the sādhaka in Jayākhyasaṃhitā, and it 
is this text that will be the basis for this chapter, I will also use her monography, an entrance 
on the Pañcarātra by her in Brill’s encyclopedia of Hinduism, and the already mentioned 
work The Tantric Body by Flood. 
The religious goals of the Pāñcarātra (like many other religious traditions’) were 
split into two different categories, (mukti or mokṣa) mumukṣu meaning liberation, and 
(bhukti or bhoga) bubhukṣu meaning enjoyment of worldly pleasures and the acquirement 
of supernatural powers (Flood, 2006, p. 26). Liberation means ending the endless 
transmigration off the souls called saṃsāra, and through it the termination of suffering. In 
the context of this thesis I will focus on bhukti, “the fulfillment of any wish that one can 
imagine”, including material wealth, good health and attainment of supernatural powers is 
what I will be focusing on. I will return to the description of how one could attain these 
powers, and how they were perceived to work later in this chapter. Both of the religious 
goals where attained by performing rituals worshipping god. The different rituals could 
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only be performed after the pañcarātrin had gone through the appropriate ritual initiation 
(dīkṣā), and so gained the correct status. The four stages of initiation described in the 
Jayākhhyasaṃhitā are the samayin, the putraka, the sādhaka, and the ācārya (Rastelli, 
2000, p. 320). The sādhaka is the one who has gone through the third dīkṣā. This dīkṣā 
gave access to both liberation and supernatural powers, but Rastelli underscores that this 
third initiation seems to have been characterized as being for the attainment of bubhukṣu.  
 
“Generally […] the sādhaka desires the fulfilment of his wishes and the achievement of 
siddhis before he attains emancipation. His main goals are powers and dominion over the 
world; only after having enjoyed these does he wish to achieve liberation from mundane  
existence” (Rastelli, 2000, p. 345). 
 
Before I can give a description of the sādhaka and the ideas about how and why he13 
acquired supernatural powers, I will give a short survey of the Pāñcarātra tradition in 
general, and the Jayākhyasaṃhitā in particular. At the end of the chapter I will discuss 
some aspects of the sādhakas practice, namely his ability to perform supernatural feats for 
other people, the ṣaṭkarmans ‘six acts’ known from other sources, and his similarity to the 
tapasvin and the yogin based on a comparison by Rastelli. Lastly I will use the tools from 
chapter 3 to shed light to some on these instances.  
 
 
The Pāñcarātra and its origins 
The Jayākhyasaṃhitā is a Vaiṣṇava Saṃhitā, a type of text that includes rules for both 
domestic and temple worship in addition to theological doctrines and guides to meditation. 
It was an important text in the Vaiṣṇava Pāñcarātra tradition. Marion Rastelli describes the 
Pāñcarātra tradition as a “Hindu tradition that worships Viṣṇu as the supreme god” 
(Rastelli, 2011 p. 444) which has roots in various earlier traditions from before the 
Common Era. This is visible in that the highest deity in the Pāñcarātra is worshipped by a 
lot of different names like Vāsudeva, Bhagavat, Nārāyaṇa and Viṣṇu, which at some point 
were distinct gods in different traditions. The earliest known forerunners to the Pāñcarātra 
are the traditions of worship to Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa, who are mentioned in a 5th century BCE 
                                                 
13 Rastelli notes that women were not able to undergo the initiation to become a sādhaka (Rastelli, 2000, p. 372). 
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text by Pāṇini. Another early important Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa text is the Bhagavadgītā section 
of the Mahābhārata, dated to the 3rd century BCE and onwards, which places Vāsudeva-
Kṛṣṇa as the supreme ruler and foundation of the universe, and is an important text for 
Vaiṣṇava traditions in general. Rastelli also mentions the 2nd century BCE cult of the 
Bhāgavata which worshipped Vāsudeva along with his brother Saṃkarṣaṇa. The worship 
of these two god-heroes has been related to the Vṛṣṇi clan who worshipped five heroes 
from at least the 1st century CE and were widespread in India by the 4th century CE. These 
five heroes are in some textual sources named as Saṃskarṣaṇa, Vāsudeva, Vāsudeva’s sons 
Pradyumna and Sāmba, and grandson Aniruddha. These are probably the origins of the 
group of vyūhas (see below) who hold an important place in the Pāñcarātra tradition 




The Jayākhyasaṃhitā is one of “three gems” (ratnatraya), the three most authoritative 
Saṃhitās of the Pāñcarātra-tradition, along with the Sātvatasaṃhitā and the 
Pauṣkarasaṃhitā. (Rastelli, 2011 p. 448) The Saṃhitās are texts with anonymous authors 
which were often compiled of other texts, revised and added to at different times, so dating 
them is difficult. Rastelli tentatively describes the Jayākhyasaṃhitā as dated not earlier 
than 850 CE (Rastelli, 1999, p.26), while Flood dates it before the 10th century  (Flood, 
2006, p. 55). The “three gems” texts have strong connections with three south Indian 
temples respectively, the Jāyakhyasaṃhitā to the Varadarāja temple in Kanchipuram. 
Rastelli however claims this only means they were “probably used there in certain periods 
of time” (Rastelli, 2011 p. 448), and that they are generally believed to have originated in 
North India as there exist early mentions of them in Kashmir and Nepal (Rastelli, 1999, p. 
27). Flood also states that “the Jayākhya is probably from the Kashmir region (Flood, 2006, 
p. 120). 
The Saṃhitā texts are written in meter, as a dialogue usually between Viṣṇu and 
someone wanting to learn his teachings. They generally consists of ritual prescription but 
also include rules of behavior, yoga instructions, cosmologies and philosophical and 
theological teachings (Rastelli, 2011 p. 447). Of the different Saṃhitās the 
Jayākhyasaṃhitā belongs to one of four who have more theoretical teachings than the 
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others. The theoretical teaching in each of them are not the same, and “one cannot speak 
of “Pāñcarātra teachings” in general, but rather of teachings of this and that Saṃhitā” 
(Rastelli, 2011 p. 451) The Jayākhyasaṃhitā teaches that the supreme being brahman is 
Vāsudeva. He emits all other deities and beings from himself, in the process called “the 
pure creation.” Vāsudeva first emits the deity Acutya, who emits Satya, who again emits 
Puruṣa. Puruṣa emits the individual souls, jīvas of humans and the avatāras of Viṣṇu. The 
group of the four foremost deities, Vāsudeva, Acutya, Satya and Puruṣa are called the 
vyūhas. The vyūhas are in the Pāñcarātra more commonly known as Vāsudeva, 
Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. In them one can see the probable influence of the 
Vṛṣṇi cult of the five heroes form the first centuries CE. The Jayākhyasahitā however also 
teaches two other creations of the world. One, borrowed from the Sāṃkhya philosophical 
school, says the ultimate source of the creation is prakṛti, the primary matter, which divides 
into 24 different constituents, tattvas, which make out the material world. The 25th tattva 
is the individual soul, puruṣa or ātman which experiences the world.  The third concept of 
creation is a mythological account where Brahmā, while being dependent on Viṣṇu, creates 
the world (Rastelli, 2011 p. 451f). These different accounts of creation from one text shows 
that it was comprised of teachings from different traditions, and that the name of the 
supreme deity varied, although it was a Vaiṣṇa god in every instance.  
 
 
Revelation of the texts 
As mentioned the Saṃhitā texts in the Pāñcarātra tradition, including the Jayākhyasaṃhitā, 
claim to originate from Viṣṇu. The stages of transmission from Viṣṇu through generations 
of more or less legendary figures to the immediate past of the religious tradition, makes 
them seem especially true and authoritative for the practitioners. These kind of 
transmission chains (Śāstrāvatāra) for texts which are supposedly revealed are common in 
texts of other traditions than the Pāñcarātra too. What is interesting in the Śāstrāvatāra of 
the Jayākhyasaṃhitā, is that the text claims that the teachings of the Vedas alone cannot 
lead a person to revelation. According to this text the ṛṣis (legendary sages to which the 
Vedas where revealed) could not reach their goal of liberation from the saṃsāra, and went 
to Śāṇḍilya “who had attained all objectives in this world” (Rastelli, 2011 p. 449) to learn 
how to attain liberation. Śāṇḍilya, through stages of transmission, had been taught by Viṣṇu 
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that the usual religious means taught in the Veda alone are not enough to attain liberation, 
one also has to recognize Nārāyaṇa as the supreme being (Rastelli, 2011 p. 449). Rastelli 
suggests that this means that the Pāñcarātra tradition saw itself as a better alternative to the 
Vedic orthopraxy, and that the Pāñcarātrins probably where thought by this orthopraxy to 
stand “outside of the Veda” although the Pāñcarātra practices where based on and similar 




In the Pāñcarātra tradition “A mantra is a manifestation of god or one of his aspects” 
(Rastelli, 2011 p. 453), and has two forms, the visual and the linguistic form. Since it is a 
manifestation of god, or his consort, limbs, attendant, weapon etc. it is also a manifestation 
of his or her divine power. E. g. the basic mantra (mūlamantra) of the Jayākhyasaṃhitā 
represents Viṣṇu with his various attributes and as different avatāras of himself.  By 
visualizing or reciting the mantra in specific rituals, the practitioner can control the divine 
power for both the purpose of liberation (mukti) and to attain worldly pleasures (bhukti), 
including supernatural powers. The mantras were secret and given by the gurus after 




In the article “The religious practice of the sādhaka according to the Jayākhyasaṃhitā” 
(Rastelli, 2000) describes the religious duties of the sādhaka, which include practices to 
become a master of the mantrasiddhi, which gives access to supernatural powers. To 
become a sādhaka, one had to undergo a third initiation (dīkṣā) after first having been 
initiated into the stages of samayin and putraka. The samayin was supposed to live in 
chastity at his guru’s house, venerate him, learn the scriptures and with the help of the guru 
conduct the daily rituals. We learn of the putraka that he “muß  im wesentlichen nach den 
gleichen Vorschriften wie der samayin leben, jedoch muß er die tägliche Verehrung des 
Gottes, ausgenommen das Feueropfer, vornehmen” (Rastelli, 1999, p. 156).14  The 
                                                 
14 “Must essentially live after the same prescriptions as the samayin, however he has to carry out the daily 
worship of the God, except for the fire sacrifice” 
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initiation to sādhaka is the third of four stages on the path to emancipation and Rastelli 
claims “The main characteristic of a sādhaka is that he desires the attainment of enjoyment 
(bhukti, bhoga), such as the dominion over the worlds or the fulfilment of all his wishes, 
and of emancipation (mukti, mokṣa) from the world” (Rastelli, 2000 p. 320). The initiation 
to sādhaka and the mastering of the mantra in the prescribed rituals are necessary for the 
attainment of both mukti and bhukti. Although according to Rastelli the text can give the 
impression that the initiation is more for the purpose of mukti and the ritual obligations 
more for the attainment of bhukti  
 
…both aspects are interdependent and thereforeindispensable for the attainment of both 
goals, because on the one handthe initiation bestows the authority (adhikāra) to worship the 
mantra and on the other the dīkṣā alone can not give bhukti or mukti if the prescribed 
worship is not performed in the right way (Rastelli, 2000 s. 320). 
 
For the purpose of bhukti the sādhaka has to achieve the means mastering of the 
mantra which is also called mantrasiddhi. Rastelli notes that the word siddhi has several 
meanings in the Jayākhyasamhita: it can mean “success”, “attainment”, “supernatural 
power”, “mastering”, and can also occur as a synonym for bhukti. In addition she says it 
seems that several of these are meant in at the same time, and that the text often does not 
distinguishes between them (Rastelli, 2000, see note 12, p. 373).  
 The different parts of the Jayākhyasamitā moreover have a different attitude on 
attainment of siddhis. Rastelli explains that the Jayākhyasaṃhitā is made of different 
currents of teachings, with the greatest contrast seen between chapter 3-5 on the one hand  
and the rest of the text on the other. In these chapters the worshipping of the mantra is 
aimed at getting the mantra’s favor instead of controlling it. This does not lead to any 
supernatural powers, and in that part of the text it is also stated that supernatural powers or 
worldly enjoyment should not be desired at all (Rastelli, 2000 see note 11 p. 372). Rastelli 
explains that the practice of the sādhaka is described in three different parts of the 
Jayākhyasaṃhitā: in chapter 17, chapter 19 and chapters 26-32. Chapter 17 is a description 
of the four stages of initiation mentioned, and describes the duties and daily routine of the 
sādhaka, chapter 19 describes the rituals to achieve the mastering of the mantra along with 
the signs of its achievement, while chapters 26-32 describe in various details how to master 
each of the different mantras specifically, and in which rituals they can be used.  Rastelli 
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claims these former two sections give general descriptions of the sādhaka, while the 
chapters 26-32 contain instructions for people who are already sādhakas, but wish to 
master a specific mantra to use it in certain rituals. The three chapters mostly agree on the 
topic of worship, although there are a few differences. Namely, the description of place of 
worship is different in chapters 26-32 where the place corresponds to the mantra, the 
mantra is worshipped as a maṇḍala ‘diagram’ instead of as an idol, and the description of 
the rituals are more detailed. This further strengthens Rastelli’s notion that chapters 26-32 
are a sort of manual for sādhakas who have already mastered a mantra, but who want to 
master a specific other one to use for a specific purpose (Rastelli, 2000, p. 320-323). 
Rastelli also notes that the depictions of the achievement of the mantrasiddhi that in chapter 
19 are laid out as “one of the main events in his [the sādhaka’s] religious career”, while in 
chapters 26-32 they are means to achieve specific goals (Rastelli, 2000, p. 338). 
 
 
The practices of the sādhaka 
 After the sādhaka is initiated he should go to a secluded and appropriate place i. e. 
a place that is auspicious and free of negative influences, or stay at home if the home is 
appropriate, and stay there for twelve years while he worships the mantra. The mantra 
should be worshipped either in a mental representation or as an idol made out of metal or 
on cloth, not of stone, clay or wood, since these materials are only appropriate for the 
achievement of mokṣa and not siddhi. (Rastelli, 2000 p. 321 and note 19 p. 373). He also 
has to follow dietary descriptions, and a precise “protocol” of daily rituals including ritual 
bathing, recitation of mantras and the daily ritual also required of lower level initiates, 
including the fire ritual. Doing this every day he is supposed to “become equal to the 
mantra” (Rastelli, 2000 p. 322). After nine years of doing this he will have acquired the 
mantrasiddhi, and thereby its power, and the prescribed duration of this worship is twelve 
years. This general description of the duties of the sādhaka  is found in chapters 17 and 19 
of the Jayākhyasamhitā, while chapters 26-32 give a more detailed prescription of the 
mantra worship; this consists of two parts, how to achieve the mastering of the different 
mantras, and then how to use them in “magical rituals of varying purposes” (Rastelli, 2000 




Worshipping the mantra  
As explained, both the details of, and the level details prescribing the worship of the mantra 
in the different chapters of the Jayākhyasaṃhitā vary, but in both the worship of a mantra 
to attain its siddhi is structured similarly as the daily worship prescribed other places in the 
text (Rastelli, 2000 p. 323). The ritual of worshipping the mantra starts with the 
mantranyāsa, in which the sādhaka ritually applies mantras to different parts of his body, 
presumably after the ritual bath (snāsa) and the purification of the elements (bhūtaśuddhi) 
(Rastelli, 2000 p. 323). In this way he gets a mantra body, and by being similar to the 
mantra he is deemed fit to worship it. After this the mantra is worshipped first mentally 
(Rastelli, 2000 p. 324) and then externally (Rastelli, 2000 p. 325) with the help of a 
maṇḍala onto which the mantra is imposed. This is followed by the construction of the 
throne, worship of varying gods, gurus, ancestors and perfected beings (siddhas). After 
this the sādhaka imposes the mantra on his body (from the mantranyāsa) onto the maṇḍala. 
He then mentally visualizes the mantra to be worshipped and the mantras belonging to it, 
and in that way makes them present. These visualizations are then worshipped with 
incense, offerings of foods and flowers etc. while the hṛdayamantra ‘heart mantra’ of the 
mantra is recited. Then a bell is rung before the mūdras of al the mantras in the maṇḍala 
are shown and then the mantra to be mastered is recited. (Rastelli, 2000 p. 328). After the 
mental and external worship oblations are made to the fire as a final worship of the deity. 
Rastelli at this point makes clear that the ritual proceedings described up until now 
is “a kind of general worship of the mantra that serves as a preliminary for the process of 
mastering the mantra” (Rastelli, 2000 p. 329) similar to the daily worship performed by 
other stages of initiates. The rituals characteristic of a sādhaka start after the homa ritual. 
The first of these are the taking of an observance or vow, (vrata) by the sādhaka which 
includes worshipping the mantra and specifications of place, garments and diet.  The 
worshipper then “assumes the form of the worshipped mantra or deity” (Rastelli, 2000 p. 
329). This is done in two steps. First the sādhaka puts on garments, ornaments and other 
requisites to make himself look like the deity in question. He then mentally visualizes or 
realizes that his form, or the form of his ātman (the self) is the mantra. This way the 
sādhaka becomes equal to the mantra both in outward appearance and in nature (Rastelli, 
2000 p. 330). After having likened himself to the mantra, the sādhaka should «go to a 
another place» (Rastelli, 2000 p. 331), where he is to follow the observances he has 
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inflicted upon himself, and continue to worship the mantra. The place should be secluded 
and deserted, and be appropriate for the mantra that is to be worshipped (e. g. in the forest 
for the forest-mantra). There are also some indications that even if he is to live there alone, 
he is in part accompanied by someone, possibly a student (Rastelli, 2000 p. 332). To master 
the mantra, it has to be recited by him a certain number of times. The quantity for the 
recitation (japa) of each specific mantra varies from 100,000 to 830,000 times, and Rastelli 
takes this to mean that the recitation is to be interrupted after a certain amount and 
continued the next day. The prescription is for the sādhaka to recite for approximately 6 
hours each day (Rastelli, 2000 p. 332). While reciting, the sādhaka should also visualize 
the mantra. After the recitation, the sādhaka should satisfy the mantra, and the mantras 
belonging to it, with another homa–ritual (fire-ritual). This time the offerings made to the 
fire are not the same as in the preliminary worship of the mantra, but are supposed to be 
particular to the specific mantra. Again there are great numbers of offering required, e.g. 
“200,000 units of candied sugar” (Rastelli, 2000 p. 333), which have to be offered over a 
span of several days and not all at the same time (Rastelli, 2000p. 334). 
 
 
The mastering of the mantrasiddhi  
Because of the many repetitions of reciting, visualizing and giving oblations to the mantra 
made over time by the sādhaka “the mantra is forced to appear in front of the sādhaka […] 
to admit that it has been mastered by him, and will be at his disposal from this time on” 
(Rastelli, 2000 p. 335).  The manner of appearance is different for each mantra, but similar 
to all of them is that the sādhaka now has mastered the mantra and is able to use its powers 
as he pleases, as he has achieved the mantrasiddhi. In Rastelli’s words, this means he will 
“be able to do whatever he desires from this time on” (Rastelli, 2000 p. 336). What is 
interesting is that the sādhaka is not only able to use the mantrasiddhi for his own gain, he 
may also use it for others. This enables him to have clients and acquire fame, something I 
will discuss further below. First however, I will give a description of some of the things 
the Jayākhyasaṃhitā list as achievable by the sādhaka, for although he is said to be able to 
achieve everything he desires, there are also very detailed descriptions of what he can 




The aims of the mantrasiddhis 
According to Rastelli, the Jayākhyasaṃhitā prescribes many rites in which the mantras 
mastered through the mantrasiddhi can be used, while also stating that the master of the 
mantrasiddhi can do whatever he wishes, so these are only examples (Rastelli, 2000 p. 
340). The mantra can be used in various ways to achieve the goals of the sādhaka, most 
notably by recitation, visualization, imposition, writing, the use of yantras or mūrtis 
‘idols’or a combination of these (Rastelli, 2000, p. 346-351) The amount of things the 
sādhaka may achieve listed by Rastelli is a lot, so I will only give a partial list, to give an 
idea of the details the text provides. Some of the things achievable the sādhaka through 
using the mastered mantra are general wishes such as good health, longevity, agelessness, 
strength, prosperity, and happiness. The sādhaka can also attain material goods like gold, 
jewels, riches, and “the rain of fruits and flowers”. He can gain protection against dangers 
like poisons, injury, and disease, and the destruction of evil beings. He has access to 
nefarious powers that lets him control, subjugate or kill other humans (more on this below) 
and he has various options for conjuring or conquering human or other females to fulfill 
his sexual wishes. Other powers include success in fights, mentally creating an army, 
victory in gambling, the ability to see past, present and future, not being conquered by any 
deity, and the ability to travel wherever he likes in this and other worlds are just some of 
the things achievable by the sādhaka (Rastelli, 2000 p. 340-344). The same thing can also 
be achieved in various ways e.g. for prolonging life and agelessness, the sādhaka can be 
given an elixir of life (rasāyana) by Nāgas or Garudas, or he can prepare it himself, or find 
it in the earth, or he can prepare herbs or other elixirs for the same purpose, or these lastly 
mentioned can be given him by a Yakṣiṇī (Rastelli, 2000, p. 341). As is easy to see, the 
possibilities the mastering of the mantra open are endless. The things acquired often 
correlate the mantras that are prescribed to achieve them. For example, the kapilamantra, 
through its relation to the founder of Sāṃkhya is used for the acquirement of knowledge 
and intelligence, while the lakṣmīmantra, associated with the goddess of wealth, prosperity 
and fortune, is used give or take away wealth. Rastelli notes that this is “probably the reason 







Rastelli takes particular note of the acts she calls “malevolent” (Rastelli, 2000 p. 342) and 
which often are known as part of the ṣaṭkarmans ‘the six acts’. The powers she describes 
as malevolent are: ākarṣaṇa (drawing towards oneself) and vaśīkaraṇa (subjugation) which 
are used to control people and beings (Rastelli, 2000 p. 341), stambhana which 
immobilizes humans and beings, uccāṭana expulses human or being from their home, 
vidveṣana causes dissension and māraṇa which is the killing of a being (Rastelli, 2000 p. 
342). She states that the term ṣaṭkarman is not used for this power in the Jayākhysaṃitā 
(Rastelli, 2000 p. 383 note 220), but that the powers enumerated usually are known under 
this term and refers to Goudriaan for a discussion of them. Goudriaan explains that the 
ṣaṭkarmans were among standard acts of magic discussed in tantric work, and describes 
them as “a theoretical body of doctrine found in Tantric Literature” (Goudriaan, 1978, p. 
254). Further he notes that the treatment and description of these was not homologous, and 
that it is difficult to delimit them as the same ability sometimes is treated under different 
headings. A good indication of this is the list he has made of “technical terms for those 
magical action which usually or often come under the head of ṣaṭkarman” (Goudriaan, 
1978, p. 259). This consists of the terms śantiḥ ‘pacification’, vaśīkaraṇam ‘subjugation’, 
stambhanam ‘immobilization’, vidveṣaṇam ‘causing dissension’, uccāṭanam ‘eradication’, 
māraṇam ‘liquidation’, mohanam ‘delusion’ ākarṣaṇam ‘attraction’, and puṣṭiḥ 
‘acquisition’.  
The point of this is to show that the authors of the Jayākhyasaṃhitā were drawing 
on an established practice of incorporating the mention of these supernatural feats into the 
texts. As Rastelli describes the practices however, it seems that there was some conflict 
within the tradition concerning if these powers could be used or not.  Rastelli describes 
how the sādhaka was prescribed to be “cruel” while doing one of these acts (Rastelli, 2000 
p. 342). She also explains how these malevolent acts are treated differently in the different 
parts of the Jayākhyasaṃhitā, chapters 26-32 treating them like the other powers, while 
chapter 19 forbids killing by use of the mantrasiddhis, and prescribes expiation rites for 
having performed the other (Rastelli, 2000 p. 342). This shows that even though the authors 





Using the mantrasiddhi for others 
What is interesting to note is that the sādhaka can use these powers not only for himself, 
but the Jayākhyasaṃhitā also says the rites prescribes can be performed “for the purpose 
of another person” in addition to the purpose of the sādhaka (Rastelli, 2000p. 340). Rastelli 
states that “the sādhaka can give this person everything he/she likes, be it happiness, health, 
property, dominion over other beings, or supernatural powers such as the eight siddhis, 
invisibility, or the ability to see everything” (Rastelli, 2000p. 340). 15 She also states that 
this person has to be another follower of Viṣṇu who is not themselves able of mastering a 
mantra (Rastelli, 2000p. 340). She further claims this means that everyone can achieve 
supernatural powers, but that these other persons would be dependent on the sādhaka, 
while the sādhaka is omnipotent on his own. Rastelli also mentions in her description of 
the sādhaka’s ability to control other people that he can make people, she mentions women 
and kings, ask him for anything. She states that this make them “dependent on his favour 
– a practice that obviously provides the sādhaka with new clients” (Rastelli, 2000 p. 342).16  
This statement is of great interest to me, and underneath will follow a discussion of things 
or services mentioned in Rastelli’s article which are part of what I have chosen to call the 




Among the many uses of the mantrasiddhi by the sādhaka Rastelli lists, there are numerous 
of them that can be used for the purposes of helping others. Some are explicitly stated to 
be for the use of others, and some are abilities that seem more suited in a situation where 
the sādhaka is doing them on the behalf of someone else. Rastelli explains that there are a 
plethora of material goods which can be acquired through supernatural means by the 
sādhaka either for himself or for “another person to whom he wants to give these things” 
(Rastelli, 2000, p. 340). Notably she states that he has the ability to help others by providing 
them with food, bring water to a desert, make it rain, and clothe a naked person (Rastelli, 
2000, p. 343). She relates how the sādhaka may recite mantras to multiply food to feed 
                                                 
15 Rastelli here refers to the eight siddhis enumerated in the Yogasūtra 
16 Here she refers to two places in the Jayākhyasaṃhitā, but her formulation does not make it clear if this is 




many people, or gold to distribute.  He has the ability to make a human being become 
“well-fed forever” and “make all the activities in a house prosper” (Rastelli, 2000, p. 349). 
In addition to bestow prosperity there are also various other things the sādhaka can do for 
others. He can dispel fever, destroy diseases, protect people against enemies, thieves, wild 
animals, snakes, and poison, and remove poison from one who is affected by it, ward 
against destructive magic and evil beings, which he can also expulse or exorcise such 
beings. He can teach love spells, which can make anyone, even ascetics, attracted to the 
user. The sādhaka also has the ability to give other supernatural abilities, e.g. he can 
transform a pot of milk, water, or honey “into an elixir (rasa) that bestows eternal youth 
and health”(Rastelli, 2000, p. 347), or give someone the ability to see everything and 
become invisible. Rastelli also points out that the sādhaka can use some of ṣaṭkarman 
abilities to help others, e.g. he can use puṣṭi ‘acquisition’ to provide for others, and śanti 
‘pacification’ to ward off evil beings. She states that the Jayākhyasaṃhitā also “describes 
rites that are counterparts of vidveṣaṇa and māraṇa” (Rastelli, 2000, p. 343) through which 
the sādhaka can make enemies reconcile or restore a person who the sādhaka has killed to 
life. He can also help others with knowledge and learning, more specifically he has the 
ability make others into a poet or a sage, or bestow upon them emancipating knowledge. 
The Jayākhyasaṃhita also states that anyone who hears him reciting the Vedas will know 
them by heart and prescribes practice which will make children and adults alike to become 
learned in the śāstras, and make scholars always speak in a very elaborate style (Rastelli, 
2000, p. 345). Rastelli also mentions other specific means by which the sādhaka can help 
others. Notably he is said to be able to provide food and protection to caravans he travels 
with, while also never getting lost (Rastelli, 2000, p. 343). The text also describes in detail 
the creation of amulets for various purposes, some of them for general wishes such as 
health and happiness, but other amulets, depending on which mantra is used in making 




Turning to the tools of discourse analysis, I would say that the supernatural powers in this 
text are related to two different discourses, they are part of two different signifying chains. 
One is the discourse of the sādhaka as aspiring to supernatural powers for his own gain, so 
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he can do as he pleases. Here the element of supernatural powers is also related to the nodal 
point of emancipation, for as we have seen, the sādhaka is usually one who strives after 
these powers, but also that he is expected to use his powers to attain emancipation after 
having enjoyed his wordly powers. “The aim of the sādhaka is not only enjoyment, but 
also final emancipation (mokṣa, apavarga), and this goal can also be achieved after having 
mastered a mantra” (Rastelli, 2000, p. 345). In other words, the supernatural powers 
acquired through the mastering of the mantra are parts of a larger discourse about the 
sādhaka as an initiated person who ultimately reaches liberation.  
The above listed uses of the supernatural powers for the help of others however, 
seem to suggest that the sādhaka, and the powers he attain through the mantrasiddhi were 
also part of a discourse which we can call I “client discourse”. My claim is that all of the 
abilities listed above show that the sādhaka was expected to attain to clients. As noted, the 
text describes how he could help various people like children, women, the sick, travelers 
etc. with issues of a wide range. Rastelli, as noted above, also explicitly states that he had 
abilities to control others which provided him with new clients. From this is seems to me 
that the sādhaka was not only one who sought out supernatural powers to use them for 
himself, but also to provide for clients, officiating and providing them with various 
services. Rastelli also points out that, after the practice which leads him to mastering the 
mantra, the sādhaka did not live in seclusion (Rastelli, 2000, p. 343). In this discourse, the 
element of supernatural powers is related to the nodal point of clients, or of service one 
could say, because what matters in this instance is how he can use them for the sake of 
others. This discourse was not restricted to the Pāñcarātra tradition either; Rastelli states 
about the rites for attaining the effect listed above, including the ṣaṭkarman rites, that they 
“are very popular ones is evident from the fact that they are given also in other Saṃhitās 
and even in texts from other traditions” (Rastelli, 2000, p. 355). This is also notable in 
Goudriaans treatment of the ṣaṭkarman rites who says they are featured in a larger number 
of Tantric works.  
 
 
The sādhaka, the tapasvin and the yogin 
In the last part of her article Rastelli compares the sādhaka with the tapasvin ‘one who 
performs tapas’, and the yogin concerning their access to and use of supernatural abilities. 
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This part of her discussion would seem to be of great interest to me, since it clearly delimits 
the religious specialist of the Pāñcarātra tradition against other similar figures. 
Rastelli states that the designation ‘tapasvin’ here “means the ascetic who practices 
austerity for the purpose of acquiring supernormal, magical powers, as described in the 
narrative parts of the Mahābhārata and not the type of ascetic who renounces the world 
and strives for emancipation as described in the didactic parts of the Mahābhārata since 
the latter has hardly anything in common with the sādhaka” (Rastelli, 2000, p. 355). She 
refers to the book tapas und tapasvin in den erzählenden Partien des Mahābhārata (1986) 
by Monica Shee and the article Tapo-Dhana (1970) by Minoru Hara for the discussion of 
the tapasvin and the yogin.  Hara’s article is a discussion on the adjectival compound “tapo-
dhana” which meaning is “the man who ‘possesses tapas as his personal property,’ or ‘has 
a property in the form of tapas.’ He bases his article on “classical Sanskrit literature” like 
the Mahābhārata, the Pañcatantra, the Hitopadeśa, the Kathāsaritsāgara and others, but 
does not give dates for these texts. Hara states that tapas is a power-substance and enables 
the tapasvin “to attain his desired objects” (Hara, 1970, p. 66). What is more, the tapasvin, 
who is always an ascetic from the Brahmin class, can “rule over the three worlds, burn 
them down, and even control the course of the sun” (Hara, 1970, p. 66) and that he therefore 
is feared by ordinary people. Tapas is acquired by the ascetic Brahmin through various 
ascetic means, like fasting, self-torment and virtuous deeds (Hara, 1970, p. 65). Shee states 
that the effect of tapas is mainly described in the Mahābhārata as power, force, energy, 
and heat (Shee, 1986, p. 190) and moreover that this power is understood as being 
supernatural and forcefully effective, when trying to define it as “magical power” (Shee, 
1986, p. 211) 
Rastelli points two several differences between the tapasvin and the sādhaka. One 
of these regards the method of acquirement of the supernatural powers, since as she points 
out, even though the mastering of the mantrasiddhi is difficult and requires a long period 
of renunciation and practice, it does “not include self-tormenting practices and 
mortification” (Rastelli, 2000, p.356) like the practice of the tapasvin. She explains how 
both of these methods give the sādhaka and the tapasvin respectively the power to do 
whatever they please, with the difference that the tapasvin’s power can be lost.  As Hara 
attests: “tapas is considered as a substance which is to be gained, but at the same time it is 
subject to decay and loss” (Hara, 1970, p. 62f). Accordingly, there are certain things the 
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tapasvin can not do without losing his powers, the most notable being succumbing to anger, 
partaking in sexual activity, or acquiring wealth or material goods, since these would be 
negation of his ascetic practice by which he acquires his powers. The mantrasiddhi 
however can use his powers for all of the above mentioned because his is of a different 
character and can not be exhausted (Rastelli, 2000, p. 356). Rastelli however also states 
that the Jayākhyasaṃhitā describes a group of Vaiṣṇava tapasvins, but that the description 
of this group does not correspond to the picture of the tapasvin painted above: “the aim of 
this group is not the acquiring of magical powers, but the purification and the devotion of 
their life to Viṣṇu. According to the JS [Jayākhyasaṃhitā] tapas is a means that purifies 
and may also evoke the grace of God” (Rastelli, 2011, p. 356f).  
Rastelli then proceeds to explain how the yogin is described in the Jayākhyasaṃitā, 
and states that he is described as an ambiguous figure.  
 
On the one hand, his refuge (gati) is God; he always thinks of God as being present in his 
heart; […] he does not even think of something that is harmful to other; and, when he attains 
emancipation, he achieves unity and identity with God. On the other hand, yogins are 
described as cruel beings that abide in the sky (Rastelli, 2011, p. 357). 
 
She explains this ambivalence with the idea that the primary goal for the yogin is 
emancipation, but that he will acquire supernatural powers on the path towards this goal, 
and refers to the vibhūti chapter in the Yogasūtra. She then refers to a “later” text on yoga, 
the Yogatattvopaniṣad, which states that supernatural powers which resemble the ones 
attained through mantrasiddhi can be acquired by the yogin trough the practices of 
mantrayoga and haṭhayoga, and that this power can be lost if the yogin engages in sexual 
practice. After this Rastelli concludes that the yogin is inferior the sādhaka in power 
because he can lose his powers, and because chapter 19 in the Jayākhyasaṃhitā states that 
the yogins are afraid of the sādhaka who has mastered the mantrasiddhi. She also claims 
that “In contrast to the sādhaka, the main aim of the yogin is emancipation” (Rastelli, 2011, 
p. 359). She also again states that for the yogin, the supernatural powers are by-product of 
the practice that leads the yogin towards the goal of emancipation, and are seen as obstacles 
because they can divert him from this goal, while they are the main goal of the sādhaka.  
I do not agree with Rastelli’s conclusion about the difference between the sādhaka, 
the tapasvin and the yogin. Referring to the discourse analysis from Laclau & Mouffe, it is 
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clear that the article constructs an antagonism between the sādhaka on the one hand, and 
the tapasvin and the yogin on the other hand. Regarding the tapasvin, Rastelli as explained 
tries to show him as a person with similar powers as the sādhaka, with the difference being 
that the sādhaka is more powerful since he can do whatever he pleases and never loses his 
power, something the tapasvin can not. Concerning the yogin, she states that he differs 
from the sādhaka in that he is not really concerned with the attainment of supernatural 
powers, as the sādhaka, but the attainment of supernatural powers. What is more, the 
powers of the yogin are also inferior to those of the sādhaka, because he can lose them and 
not do whatever he pleases with them. Looking at the descriptions of the sādhaka, the 
tapasvin, and the yogin she depicts in her article however, it seems clear to me that these 
three terms can not be constructed as clear cut categories like Rastelli does. I would rather 
propose to see these three terms as ‘floating elements’ which as explained in chapter 3 
means nodal points which acquire a different meaning according to which discourse they 
are in, and which other elements they are related too. This can be said of every element of 
every discourse, but floating signifiers as earlier stated are elements who are particularly 
open for meaning ascriptions of different kinds. Even though using these terms as clear cut 
categories does not seem to work, it is worth noting that the discussion by Rastelli shows 
that there were other types of religious specialists which also were renown for having 
supernatural powers, and that these can be ascribed characteristics which sometimes are 



















In the article “My Miracle Trumps Your Magic: Encounters with Yogīs in Sufi and Bhakti 
Hagiographical Literature”, which also appears in the anthology Yoga Powers – 
Extraorinary Capacities Attained Through Meditation and Concentration (Jacobsen, 2012), 
assistant professor of religious studies at the New York University Patton Burchett 
discusses hagiographical texts which describe “contests” of supernatural powers between 
bhakti or Sufi saints and yogins, most often from the Nāth tradition. In this paper, I will 
concentrate on the depictions of how the supernatural powers of the bhakti devotees are 
described. First I will give a description of the aims of Burchett’s article and then give a 
short presentation of the Bhakti and Nāth traditions. Following this I will give account for 
the analytical categories of ‘miracle’ and ‘magic’ Burchett uses, before I go on to a 
presentation of the stories found in the texts Burchett discusses. Lastly follows my own 
analysis of some of these stories, which will be further expounded on in chapter 7. 
 
 
The aim of the article  
Burchett states that the article has several aims. He wants to show that both Sufi and Bhakti 
traditions of 14th – 18th century north India make a key distinction between the categories 
of miracle and magic by examining Sufi and Bhakti Hagiographical literature. 
Furthermore, he wants to use this discussion to show how north Indian bhakti was heavily 
influenced by the Sufi tradition, and that both played a role in the marginalization of the 
tantric movement, especially the Nāth yogins (Burchett, 2012, p. 345).  
The scope of his article is large, and I will for the most part focus on his work on Bhakti 
hagiographic stories featuring displays of supernatural powers. I will however give a short 





Sufism, bhakti and the Nāth tradition 
Burchett starts out by refuting the idea of a single Bhakti movement as it is often narrated 
by scholars and devotees alike. He claims that the narrative that the bhakti movement began 
in the south, and then swept upwards to northern India throughout the centuries is not 
correct. He argues that there was not necessarily a coherence and continuity in bhakti 
traditions of different regions, and that this narrative about one collective movement is a 
later construct. Instead he proposes to see the bhakti movement (he refers only to the north 
Indian one) as a “diverse set of communities linked” by emphasis on emotional personal 
devotion to a god, often expresses through song, production of literature based on the lives 
and poetry of some of their saints, and their opposition to a form of religiosity exemplified 
by the Nāth yogins, which focused on rituals, tapas (austerities), and the personal acquiring 
of power. He further refers to John Stratton Hawley and points out that the function of this 
narrative of the migration of the bhakti movement from the south to the north, was a way 
for the north Indian bhakti traditions to claim old age to their traditions. As seen Burchett 
sees this idea as a construct and claims the bhakti movement of north India has had much 
influence from Islam and the Sufi movement in particular. He points to the similarities 
between earlier Sufi and later Bhakti writings, both hagiographical and poetic (Burchett, 
2012, p. 347-349). This debate, in which amount north Indian bhakti was influenced by 
Sufism, and if it was a continuity of the south Indian bhakti movement, is outside the scope 
of this study. What is more interesting is Burchett’s next statement, where he claims the 
tantric movements, especially “tantric yogis and ascetics, who often seem to have served 
as a crucial foil for emerging conceptions of bhakti self-identity” (Burchett, 2012, p. 349). 
This statement is a very interesting one regarding the topic of this study, and I will discuss 
it more later on. I will now give a short introduction of these yogins.  
 
 
The Nāth tradition 
The yogins Burchett is referring to in the statement above, and the ones featuring in the 
hagiographic texts he discusses are “most clearly represented by the tantric asceticism and 
magic of the pervasive Nāth yogis of the day” (Burchett, 2012, p. 347). Burchett describes 
the Nāth tradition as “Not a monolithic order, but rather a confederation of ascetics groups 
claiming a similar body of Śaiva and Siddha tradition” (Burchett, 2012, p. 353), which first 
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emerged in the 13th century centering around the legendary founder Gorakhnāth. He states 
that they built on certain elements of earlier tantric cults, namely the haṭhayogic techniques 
of bodily posture and control known as ‘hydraulic dynamics’ along with alchemical 
practices. These were used and for the attainment of this-worldy goals like immortality and 
power. For further information, he refers to David Gordon White’s monography The 
Alchemical Body: Siddha Traditions in Medieval India (1996).17 I will use this and William 
Pinch’s study Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires (2006), on which Burchett’s article also 
relies, to give a short overview of the Nāth tradition.  
 White refers to this tradition as the Nāth Siddhas, and begins his tracing with an 
explanation of the term Siddha. He notes that the common noun siddha18 means ‘realised’ 
or ‘perfected one’ and was used for a practitioner who had realized his goal of supernatural 
powers (siddhi) and immortality. Furthermore, the term Siddha became known as a 
designation for devotees in various religious groups, among them devotees of Śiva, 
alchemists, Buddhist follower of Tantra and “most especially, a mainly north Indian group 
known as the Nāth Siddhas” (White, 1996, p. 2). Followers of this tradition are variously 
designated as Yogi or Jogi, which is to broad a term in White’s eyes, Kānphaṭa Yogi, which 
is too narrow since it only applies to a specific order within the tradition, Gorakhnāthi in 
reference of the alleged founder of the order (even though he is not deemed so by all of the 
various orders) and Nāth Siddha. The latter term is the one preferred by White (White, 
1996, p. 99f). Burchett variously calls them Nāth Siddhas, Nāth yogi or yogi, and I will use 
the term Nāth yogin. 
 The term Siddha is even more complicated because it was also a designation for a 
group of semi-divine “perfected human” who have been venerated since the beginning of 
the common Era. These beings where thought to live in an elevated world full of sensual 
bliss, which has also been the goal of various religious practices. They were venerated by 
followers of various traditions, including the Nāth tradition. Indeed, instead of merely 
worshipping them and hoping for their favor the Nāth yogins sought to develop means to 
                                                 
17 White also defines the Nāth sampradaya ‘school’ as “not a monolithic order, but rather a confederation 
of groups claiming a similar body of Śaiva and Siddha tradition” which emerged around the 13th century, 
and which claimed Goraknāth or one of nine other semi-divine Nāths as their founding figure” (White, 
1996, p.90). In other words, it seems clear that Burchett relies heavily on White’s understanding of Nāth 
yogins. 
18 Which originates from the same verbal root sādh/sadh ‘to realize, succeed’ as the term siddhi (White, 
1996, s.354 note 4). 
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become such a semi-divine being, and this of course included supernatural powers (White, 
1996, p. 4).  
 William Pinch writes about the emerging conflict between yogins and bhaktas ‘one 
adhering to bhakti’ in the Mughal period in North India in his book Warrior Ascetics and 
Indian Empires (2006). He describes the medieval yogins as follows: “Yogis were 
concerned not with the niceties of group identity in relation to an external God, but with 
how to cultivate supernormal powers within and thereby attain immortality” (Pinch, 2006, 
p. 56). He furthermore points out how these were disdained by the bhaktas who lectured 
humble and loving devotion to a god. They saw the ideals of the yogins, who wanted to 
become gods and acquire supernatural powers through haṭhayogic and tantric practices, as 
repulsive. This disdain is expressed in an abundance of stories where yogins who are 
defeated by bhaktas in contests of supernatural nature (Pinch, 2006,  p. 211). Furthermore, 
Pinch notes that the yogins of this tradition “emerge only as a negative imprint in 
devotional literature” (Pinch, 2006, p. 196), and that there is no literature describing similar 
encounters written by the Nāth yogins themselves. The discourse presented in the stories 
below is in other words only seen from one side of the conflict.  
 
 
The distinction between miracle and magic  
As explained the aim of Burchett’s article is to show that Bhakti religions made a 
distinction between the categories of miracle and magic, and that this distinction can be 
traced to the Sufi traditions in India. He notes that the word miracle stems from the Latin 
mirari ‘to wonder at’ and mirus ‘wonder-ful’, and that it has generally been used as an 
expression for divine intervention. Furthermore, Abrahamic religions have used this as a 
category for extraordinary powers which distinguishes it from ‘magic’, which is also a 
category of extraordinary powers without root in the divine.  He claims that “the category 
of ‘miracle’ is not South Asian in origin and seems to have no exact counterpart in Indian 
sources prior to the thirteenth century (Burchett, 2012, p. 358). Rather than the distinctions 
between powers given by god and others, Indian culture has understood extraordinary 
powers as being acquirable by multiple sources. From this he concludes that the ultimately 
Abrahamic distinction between the categories of miracle and magic were introduced to 
Hinduism in the bhakti Hagiographies via their link to Sufism (Burchett, 2012, p. 358-
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360). Discussing the claim that this distinction came to India from the Abrahamic religions 
is outside the scope of this story, however I will examine if this distinction is there in the 
stories Burchett mentions, and what function they might have.  
 
 
Stories of Sufi and bhakti saints 
Burchett presents several stories about Sufi and bhakti devotees performing miracles 
through the power of god. The stories he presents can be roughly categorized into two 
different forms. One being stories where the devotee performs a miracle that exceeds the 
supernatural deeds of a yogin. The others being stories where the devotees state that such 
‘miracles’ are superfluous because what matter is the devotion to god. These latter ones 
still often feature the devotee performing a miracle of some sort, usually as response to a 
threat to their lives. I will give a short description of the instances he mentions, before 




Saints vs. yogins 
Burchett relays several stories in which devotees are challenged by yogins to a contest of 
supernatural powers. The first one is a levitation contest, found in a 14th century text. In 
this story, the Sufi devotee, Shaykh Nizam ud-Din Auliya of Delhi, bests the nameless 
yogin through calling on the power of his god. After seeing this, the yogin admits defeated 
and states that the Shaykhs power, being bestowed by god, are greater than his own 
(Burchett, 2012, p. 355).  We read about the bhakta Nāmdev who bests the Nāth yogin 
Jñāndev in aquiering water (more on this below), and then later a story about Jñāndev, now 
described as a bhakti saint. Here he is in a supernatural competition with another Nāth 
yogin, Chāngdev, who rides on a tiger and uses snakes as whips, but Jñāndev bests him by 
making a wall move forward to interfere (Burchett, 2012, 364-368). Burchett also 
discusses on story from the 1730’s about Guru Nānak from what he calls “the bhakti 
hagiographical literature of the Sikhs” (Burchett, 2012, p. 370), where Guru Nānak visits 
a Nāth location and has a hide-and-seek competition with the Nāth yogin Bhangarnāth. 
Guru Nānak merges into the four elements and becomes invisible, and not even the semi-
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divine Siddhas Bhangarnāth has called upon to help him can find Guru Nānak. After the 
Siddhas admit defeat, Guru Nānak lectures them about how all supernatural prowess are 
fruitless and futile in comparison to the limitless powers of god’s gifts.   
 In all the stories above, a bhakta devotee (Burchett does not explicitly state this, but 
it is clear that he reckons early Sikh texts to be a part of the North Indian bhakti tradition) 
willingly enters into a situation where his supernatural powers, bestowed by god, are 
measured against those of the yogins. They feats the bhakti devotees perform are not only 
better than the yogin’s, they outclass them by far. For example, in the first story, the yogin 
is able to levitate a few meters into the Air, while the Shayk flies out of his palace in every 
direction he pleases. Burchett states how this shows the idea that “While yogis may obtain 
powers through their austerities and ascetic practice, hey are hard earned and limited, 
unlike the infinite power of god for which the Sufi is a conduit” (Burchett, 2012, p. 356). 
Here, and in the other stories, we see that the ability of the yogins to perform supernatural 
feats is not disputed. However, the superiority of those who rely on god to help them 
perform such feat is shown clearly.  In the next stories I will describe, we see a somewhat 
different pattern, in that the devotees here depicted do not wish to perform any supernatural 
feats to begin with. 
 
 
The superfluousness of supernatural powers 
Burchett refers to several stories of the second category, in which devotees mark 
supernatural powers as superfluous. The first one he relays is a story set in the year 1400, 
where the Shaykh Sayyid Muhammad Gesudaraz refuses the supernatural gifts offered by 
the Nāth yogin Bālgundāī. The yogin offers the Shaykh various supernatural gifts such as 
the secrets of alchemy, a substance which gives the ability to turn invisible, and a display 
of the yogins ability by making the Shaykh’s cot move by itself. The Shayk rejects all these 
offers with the argument that such superfluities are of no use to one who has taken refuge 
in god (Burchett, 2012, p. 361). Most of the stories however, have the Sufi and bhakti saints 
proclaim supernatural feats as superfluous, but then performing them nonetheless. The first 
example of this Burchett mentions is a story about a yogin gifting a gold-producing 
philosopher’s stone to a Sufi Shaykh, who considers it worthless and throws it into a 
stream. When the yogin goes to find the stone in the stream, he discovers there thousands 
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of philosopher’s stones, and realizing the Shayks superiority ask to become his disciple 
and learn to overcome such worldly desires (Burchett, 2012, p. 362). In the bhakti 
hagiographical literature, we hear about several bhakti saints who upon threats to their 
lives, perform miracles through the help of god.  Burchett relays a story about Tulsīdās 
who is requested to demonstrate his supernatural powers for the Mughal emperor. Tulsīdās 
refuses, and is sent to prison by the emperor. Upon this, Tulsīdās prays to Hanumān who 
answers by sending an army of monkeys to “wreak havoc upon the palace” (Burchett, 2012, 
p. 373). The story ends with the emperor bowing down to Tulsīdās in shame. Burchett also 
mentions a similar story about the Shah Sikander Lodi upon complaints from both Hindus 
and Muslims orders the 15th century bhakti saint Kabīr executed. Kabīr is consecutively 
bound by chains and thrown into the river, set on fire, and stood before a frenzied battle 
elephant, but each time emerges unscathed. After this Sikander admits the superiority of 
Kabīr’s god. (Burchett, 2012, p. 374-375) Burchett states that these stories, in which the 
devotee refuses to perform supernatural feats show that both Sufis and bhaktas considered 
such feats “futile since they are done for man’s ends, not out of love for God” (Burchett, 
2012, p. 373). The only thing that matters for the authors of these stories are the devotion 
to god. This god then, out of mercy and compassion to their devotees, comes to their aid, 
and they perform miraculous feats. We will also see this trope clearly in the text I will be 
discussing in more detail below.  
 
 
Performing miracles with god’s help 
In the work Stories of Indian Saints: English translation of Mahipati’s Marathi 
Bhaktavijaya (1933) by Justin Abbott and Narhar Godbole we can find the story about 
Nāmdev and Jñāndev and having to acquire water by supernatural means. These two, the 
bhakti saint in this work under the name ‘Nama’ and the Nāth yogin Jñāndev under the 
name ‘Dnyandev’ are traveling together through the desert of Marwad. They are overcome 
with thirst and find a deep well, and need a method to get the water out of it. Jñāndev uses 
his yoga powers and reduces his own size, so he can climb down the well and drink the 
water. Nama can think of no way to obtain the water, so Jñāndev offers to bring him some 
through the same means he had used earlier. Nāmdev however refuses this and tells him 
“Have patience for a moment and see a miracle” (Abbott and Godbole, 1933, p. 188). He 
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then prays to Kṛṣṇa and cries for his help. It is related how Kṛṣṇa hears his prayer and 
rushes to Nāmdev’s aid, filling the well and making it overflow. Seeing this Jñāndev admits 
that he does not understand how Nāmdev has made god his debtor, so he would come to 
his aid and perform “this seemingly impossible miracle” (Abbott and Godbole, 1933, p. 
190). Burchett remarks that again in this story “the power of God, and of devotion to God, 
is shown as dramatically superior to the powers of yoga” (Burchett, 2012, p. 365). 
 Earlier on in the same work as quoted above, the author relates another story of 
Nāmdev performing a miracle, this time not in a competition with a yogin, but as a response 
to the threat on his life. This story takes places in Delhi, where Nāmdev gains a great 
assembly listening to his songs and prayers, all playing, singing and dancing along with 
him. Further the authors relate how news of Nāmdev and his gathering reached the ears of 
the “evil-minded” Muhammadan king who lived in the city. He goes to Nāmdev’s 
gathering and amidst them kills a cow, requesting of Nāmdev: “What is it you are singing, 
you heretic? If you will raise this cow again to life I shall regard your songs as true. If you 
do not bring the cow to life, I shall kill you with my own hand” (Abbott and Godbole, 1933, 
p. 172). Nāmdev answers that it will take him four days to raise the cow to life, and sets 
about praying to Kṛṣṇa for help. After four days Kṛṣṇa come to him and raises the cow to 
life, even stating that he would have done so immediately had Nāmdev not said it would 
take him four days. After the king hears this, he pays obeisance to Nāmdev, who is praised 
by the assembly for his feat. (Abbott and Godbole, 1933, p. 171-175)  
 
In the two stories above we see the supernatural abilities Nāmdev uses as explained as 
coming from god, whereas the powers of the Nāth yogin Jñāndev are described as powers 
acquired through his Yoga practice. As stated above, Burchett claims the texts clearly 
distinguish between the two, and establishes a category of ‘miracle’ being the supernatural 
powers originating in god and ‘magic’ being the supernatural powers acquired through the 
practice of the yogin. I concur with Burchett in that there is a clear-cut difference between 
these two categories, however I disagree with his construction of the two opposing terms 
‘miracle’ and ‘magic’. His use of the term ‘miracle’ for the supernatural powers attain by 
the bhakti saints through the grace of god is in my view an apt description. As we see 
above, this is the term used in the translation of the Bhaktavijaya. Furthermore, Burchett 
states that in contrast to the terms used for the yogin’s supernatural power, the supernatural 
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powers of the devotees in the hagiographic literature is often described by the term 
karāmāt, which is used to denote miracles (Burchett, 2012, p. 356).  
Using the term ‘magic’ as designation for the supernatural powers of the yogins in 
these stories however, is something I find problematic. In the book Naming the witch : 
magic, ideology, & stereotype in the ancient world (2007) Kimberly Stratton discusses the 
term ‘magic’. She claims that magic is not a given category of certain practices, but a way 
for people in specific cultures to label certain practices, individuals or groups. The idea of 
magic is in this way created, shaped, sustained and changed by social discourse in a specific 
culture. Furthermore, both the claim that someone else is using magic, and the claim that 
oneself uses, or has the ability to use magic, is tied to notions of power because magic is 
seen as an illicit, dangerous, and/or subversive power. Likewise, Otto & Stausberg, in the 
introduction to their book Defining magic – A reader (2013) state that throughout its history 
the term has been used to denounce certain practices as something negative, illicit, impure 
etc. on account of both representatives of religious groups as well as by scholars. The term 
and its uses have therefore been thoroughly criticized by scholars, both on the grounds that 
the term is used in a derogatory way, that it is not used in the correct way or that it should 
not be used at all  (Otto and Stausberg, 2013 p. 1-5). The yogins supernatural powers are 
not described in this way in the hagiographical stories Burchett examines. Burchett states 
that they are described as futile, trivial, and superfluous, and inferior to the power of god, 




In the two stories relayed in the Bhaktavijaya work, and in the other stories Burchett refers 
to, we can see the two different categories of miracle stories Burchett identifies in his 
article. In both of these the authors establish an antagonistic relation between the bhakti 
saint and the opponent. This opponent is either a yogin possessing supernatural powers, or 
someone skeptic of the bhakti tradition, usually a ruler, who the bhakti saint has to convince 
about the superiority of the bhakti tradition over others. In chapter 3 I explained how the 
identity of an element is established through its relation to something that is different of it, 
and that this difference constitutes the border of antagonism between the two elements. My 
claim is that the category of the miraculous powers of the bhakti, which is distinguished by 
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being bestowed by god and not attained through yogic or other ascetic practice, and by 
therefore being far superior to the supernatural power of the yogin, can only be constructed 
this way by relating it to ‘Other’ which in this case is the supernatural power of the yogin. 
Burchett’s statement that the yogins served as a foil for the emergence of the bhakti identity 
also clearly shows this. In the stories discussed above there are also several instances where 
the supernatural power of the bhakti saint is not showcased as part of a contest with a yogin, 
but after a disclamation from the bhakta where he states that such powers are superfluous 
and that all that matters is the devotion to god. These types of stories again serve to establish 
the element of “devotion to god” as better than anything else. The bhakti saints are 
constructed as different from the ones requesting the supernatural powers in that they give 
them no heed, and are then shown as being superior in that they still possess these kinds of 
power. Thus, they are given their meaning, and a superiority, by their negation of the yogin, 




























In this chapter I will discuss the material presented in the preceding chapters according to 
the theory described in chapter 3 of this thesis. Before going into a discussion of the concept 
of interdiscursivity I will give a summary of the analysis done in the preceding chapters. 
Lastly, I will discuss how the notions of supernatural powers discussed in this thesis were 




Summary of the preceding chapters 
In the chapter presenting Malinar’s discussion of supernatural powers in the Mahābhārata 
we saw the element of supernatural powers being given its meaning through relations to a 
variety of different nodal points. In the story of Śuka, we saw supernatural powers being 
related to the idea of nodal point of liberation, here conceptualized as piercing through the 
disc of the sun. The element of supernatural powers is again related to the nodal point of 
liberation in chapter 12.289 of the Mahābhārata, only here liberation is conceptualized as 
living in a state where one controls the unmanifest matter or the universe, otherwise known 
as prakṛtilaya. In chapter 12.228 supernatural powers are again related to the nodal point 
of liberation, this time conceptualized as the liberating knowledge of the distinction 
between puruṣa and prakṛti. In this case, the relation differs from those earlier mentioned, 
in that the relation is one of negation; supernatural powers are described as something that 
is attained on the path to liberation, but something that has to be given up to achieve 
emancipation. This is different from chapter 12.289 were the element of supernatural 
powers are equated to liberation, the state of liberation described in this chapter is defined 
by having access to such supernatural powers. In the last part of the Mahābhārata Malinar 
discusses, supernatural powers are not related to a nodal point of liberation, but to the idea 
of Kṛṣṇa as the supreme being. As related earlier, the idea of supernatural powers here 
become crucial to the conceptualization of Kṛṣṇa as a supreme being distinct from and 
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superior to any other god, which becomes crucial to the understanding of god for bhakti 
devotees.  
 In the chapter about the sādhaka as a mantrasiddhi, the element of supernatural 
powers gets its meaning through two different discourses. The first is the discourse of the 
sādhaka’s own personal goal, described as both bhukti and mukti, which both are achieved 
through the practice that lets him master the mantra. As discussed, my claim is that the 
supernatural powers described in this chapter are also part of a discourse about the sādhaka 
as an officiant who offered services to his clients, which can be seen by the described 
effects his supernatural powers can lead to. 
 In hagiographic literature discussed by Burchett we see the element of supernatural 
powers being split into two distinctive categories, i. e. into two different elements. One of 
these is the element of supernatural powers related to the yogins, and especially to the Nāth 
yogins. For them, supernatural powers, and especially immortality, are seen as the goal of 
their practice. This element of the supernatural powers as conceived by the yogins then 
acts as a foil to the element of supernatural powers as it is conceived by the bhakti saints. 
For them supernatural powers is not something acquired through practice but something 
bestowed by god, and rather than being their goal, supernatural powers are seen as 




Before discussing the question of how the element of supernatural powers works in 
discourses of power, I will give a short comment on interdiscursivity, and especially 
interdiscursivity leading to ambivalence in the discourses discussed above. As mentioned 
in chapter 3, Fairclough describes the term interdiscursivity as being how a text is shaped 
through discursive conventions. In other words, how the elements in a specific text are 
given meaning through a relation to various discourses. If the elements are given their 
meaning by being related directly to another text, Fairclough terms it intertextuality. What 
is notable for the discourses I have discussed in this thesis, is that Fairclough states that if 
the various text or discourses elements of a given text are related to via interdiscursivity 
are contradictory, then it leads to a text with an ambivalent or contradictory meaning. Using 
the tools from Laclau & Mouffe one could say that the elements in such discourses, in a 
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higher degree than others, become overdetermined; they are given a surplus of meaning by 
being related to various different elements and discourses. As I have shown in this thesis, 
this seems to be the case in the texts I have discussed in preceding chapters. 
 As discussed, the element of supernatural powers is given a variety of meaning 
through different relations in the Mahābhārata. This, using the idea of interdiscursivity, 
can be stated to be symptomatic of the fact that the Mahābhārata, as stated earlier, is an 
incredibly long and complex text, composed by a plethora of authors through several 
centuries. Thus, it is shaped by a multitude of various discourses. We have seen that 
especially discourses concerning the systems of Yoga and Sāṃkhya have shaped the ideas 
about supernatural powers in the Mahābhārata. It is also here worth noting that these two 
systems at the time of the Mahābhārata were not yet clearly differentiated, and that the 
text also is shaped by conflicting discourses of what constitutes the system of Sāṃkhya and 
Yoga, and if they are two separate systems or not (see e.g. (Larson, 1979)). This 
ambivalence in those discourses also contributes to the overdetermination of the element 
of supernatural powers in the Mahābhārata. 
 In the Jayākhyasaṃhitā, which as Rastelli states also is a compilation of texts 
written by various authors, we also see how interdiscursivity leads to overdetermination of 
certain elements. Most notable for this thesis are the expressed attitudes to the acquirement 
of supernatural powers through the mantrasiddhi by the sādhaka, and the usage of the 
ṣaṭkarman rites. As noted, chapters 3-5 of the Jayākhyasaṃhitā describe the supernatural 
effects attainable by the sādhaka as hindrances to his goal of attaining emancipation, and 
express caution in regards to, and in one case forbids, the use of the ṣaṭkarman rites. The 
statements stand in contradiction to the treatment of supernatural powers in the rest of the 
text. Rastelli claims this part of the text is written by other authors than the rest of the text, 
and we can attest that also here interdiscursivity leads to an overdetermination of the 
element of supernatural powers.  
 There does not seem to be as much ambivalence concerning the element of 
supernatural powers in the hagiographical literature discussed by Burchett. Here the 
meaning of supernatural elements as something that can be achieved through various 
practices, but superior if achieved through the grace of god, and the same time not 
something to strive for in any case, seem to be fairly fixed. Using terms from Laclau and 
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Mouffe, one can say that the authors of these text have succeeded in a hegemonic 




Now for the question of how the element of supernatural powers can be said to be a part of 
discourses of power. In chapter 3 I relayed Fairclough’s theory of discourse. Fairclough 
states that discourse constitutes and constructs social structure, and thus also shapes social 
identities, social relations between people, and systems of knowledge and belief. On 
account of this, the meaning of an element in a discourse becomes instructive for the 
abovementioned, because changing discursive elements can lead to a change in one or 
several discourses, which again facilitates a change in identites, systems of knowledge and 
belief, or social relations. This way, discursive practice can both restructure or sustain 
power relations. Since the texts I have discussed in this thesis stem from a time several 
centuries to several millennia ago, it is difficult know much about specific power relations 
in their time. Nevertheless, I will try to give an account of how the discourses I have 




As we have seen, the element of supernatural powers in the Mahābhārata is part of several 
texts where we see a conflict between and within the traditions of Yoga and Sāṃkhya about 
what constitutes liberation, and how it is to be achieved. In one of these texts, chapter 
12.289, this conflict between Yoga and Sāṃkhya is even mentioned explicitly when 
Bhisma states: “The followers of Sānkhya praise the Sānkhya system and those regenerate 
persons that are Yogins praise the Yoga system. For establishing the superiority of their 
respective systems, each calls is own system to be better” (Roy, 1891, p. 570). More than 
attesting that there was a conflict, we can also see that certain of meanings given to the 
element of supernatural powers have come out of the conflict as “victorious”. In the story 
of Śuka we saw supernatural powers acquired through the means of yoga being related to 
the Vedic idea of liberation as piercing the disk of the sun. This is an idea that can be found 
several places in the Mahābhārata, but is not found in newer texts on yoga (see chapter 3 
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in White, 2009). The notion of prakṛtilaya as the final goal of liberation is also an idea one 
can find traces of in the Mahābhārata, but which by this time and this work also is seen as 
inferior to other notions of liberation in the Sāṃkhya system (Jacobsen, 1999, p. 273). An 
idea related to that of prakṛtilaya is the notion that liberation is perceived as a state in which 
the individual becomes a god through his supernatural powers. This idea can be found not 
only in traditions of Sāṃkhya, but also certain Śaiva sectarian traditions. According to 
Gavin Flood the Śaiva Siddhānta taught that the soul upon liberation “becomes equal to 
Śiva […], possessing all of Śiva’s powers of omniscience and omnipotence”(Flood, 2005, 
p. 211) Alexis Sanderson states that the final goal of the Pāśupata tradition was liberation, 
meaning the end of suffering, but that this state also was “conceived positively as the 
assimilation of Rudra’s [Śiva’s] qualities of omniscience, omnipotence and so forth at the 
time of one’s death” (Sanderson, 1988, p. 664). Scholars seem to disagree however, on 
how much the both the Śaiva Siddhānta and Pāśupata traditions focused on the acquirement 
of supernatural powers, and if they indeed led to liberation. Sanderson does not mention 
the attainment of supernatural powers any further in his treatment on the pāśupatas. When 
writing about the Māntramarga, which the Śaiva Siddhānta was a part of, he states that it, 
though accommodating “the quest for liberation, is essentially concerned with the quest for 
supernatural experiences (bhoga)” (Sanderson, 1988, p. 667). He does however not 
mention either supernatural powers or the idea of liberation as becoming a godlike being 
in his short treatment on the tradition. Diwakar Acharya on the other hand in his essay on 
the pāśupatas in Brill’s Encyclopdia of Hinduism states that “they acquired supernatural 
powers in their lifetime” with their practice (Acharya, 2011, p. 460), but does not mention 
the idea that they become godlike. Gavin Flood does not mention supernatural powers or 
a godlike liberation state at all in his short description of the pāśupatas (Flood, 2005, p. 
206f). Geoffrey Samuel on the other hand, in his work The Origins of Yoga and Tantra – 
Indic religions to the Thirteenth Century (2008) relays that it is significant that the pāśupata 
was expected to gain what he calls ‘magical ritual powers’ and that “The powers achieved 
are essentially those of Śiva himself” (Samuel, 2008, p. 242). Looking at these different 
statements it might seem that the Pāśupata and Śaiva Siddhānta tradition held the same 
kind of conflict of tradition as the Sāṃkhya and yoga ones, with some strata of them 
focusing more on liberation and some of powers, even though both were achieved through 
becoming (like) Śiva.  
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 All of the abovementioned discourses, where the element of supernatural powers 
either leads to or is equated with liberation, seem to have decreased in popularity in favor 
of the interpretation of this element as we saw it in chapter 12.228 in the Mahābhārata. 
This chapter states that supernatural powers are acquired on the path towards liberation, 
but that these powers are a distraction, they should not be used, and have to be given up 
before the final state of liberation. This conception of supernatural powers is seen in most 
later text on yoga and Sāṃkhya, as attested by Jacobsen (see Jacobsen, 1999) and Pflueger, 
who states that most of the commentaries on the Yogasūtra do not display any interest in 
the supernatural powers said to be attained by the yogin through his practice (Pflueger, 
2005). 
Lastly, the discourse of Kṛṣṇa as a supreme being in the Bhagavadgītā, which we 
have seen was conceptualized through him being a master of supernatural powers, is a 
notion that has had a large impact on Indian tradition. As Narayanan explains, the idea of 
Kṛṣṇa, or another Vaiṣṇava deity, as a supreme ruler who can bestow liberation upon 
devotees is a central part, a nodal point, of the bhakti tradition, which gained greatly in 





In chapter 5 I explained how the element of supernatural powers in the Jayākhyasaṃhitā 
is part of a larger “client-discourse” where the sādhaka is expected to provide services for 
various people. For the discussion of the Pāñcarātra tradition in a discourse of power, it is 
notable that the sādhaka is said to be able to provide certain services that would seem of 
great interest to a ruler, or someone who wants to rule. For example, the Jayākhyasaṃhitā 
includes descriptions of the sādhaka’s ability to destroy enemy armies, make someone a 
king, ensure success and victory in fights, and the ability to ascertain victory at the royal 
court or in instance of law and disputations (Rastelli, 2000, p. 341). This implies that the 
sādhaka had noble and royal patronage, and this is attested by White, who states that 
Pāñcarātra initiation was “was administered to kings by Vaiṣṇava sectarians throughout 
medieval India” (White, 2003, p. 6). What is more, tantric practitioners like the sādhaka of 
the Pāñcarātra tradition where often becoming appointed as official chaplains for kings and 
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other royals, in addition to being “independent practitioners called upon at times of need” 
(Samuel, 2008, p. 299). 
 
 
Hagiographic bhakti literature 
That the struggle between bhakti saints and Nāth yogins described in the hagiographic 
bhakti literature of north India was an outcome of real struggles for power between these 
two groups, is attested by Burchett who states that the hagiographic stories “seemingly 
illustrate just how clear to everyone this confrontation [i.e. the confrontation between 
adherents to the bhakti tradition and the tantric yogins] was becoming in the north Indian 
religious landscape of the time” (Burchett, 2012, p. 365). Pinch also points out that 
following the growing popularity of bhakti with both the ordinary people and the elite there 
emerged a conflict with the political power of the yogins of that region. He also explains 
that the bhakti condemnation of the yogins found in the bhakti literature was a product of 
a socio-political state where “Indian rulers were allying themselves […] with the symbols, 
structures, and proponents of this devotional belief to shore up their claims to political 
legitimacy” and that this royal power stood in contrast to the political and military power 
that was made up of bands of itinerant yogins across northern India at the time (Pinch, 




As I stated in the first chapter of this thesis, the aim of my study is to show that supernatural 
powers are not unimportant, irrelevant or self-explanatory, but that they should be studied 
within the context of Indian culture, just as any other aspect of Indian traditions. Through 
my discussion of the supernatural powers described in the Mahābhārata, the 
Jayākhyasaṃhitā, and the hagiographic bhakti literature, I have shown how supernatural 
powers are part of larger discourses of powers, that their inclusion in such discourses gives 
them various functions, and that they can be an important part of constructing those 
discourses, and through them, society. Thus, I stand by my claim that supernatural powers 
are worth studying for anyone wanting to understand the larger context of Indian religious 
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Abstract in Norwegian 
Denne oppgaven begynte med oppdagelsen at det ikke er skrevet mye forskningslitteratur 
om oppnåelse av overnaturlige evner i Indisk religion, selv om det er mange tekster som 
nevner personer som innehar disse evnene. Dette er fordi forskere som regel ser på disse 
evnene som overtro eller levninger fra en svunnen arkaisk tid. Som respons på dette ønsket 
jeg å undersøke enkelte tekstinstanser der en kunne finne beskrivelser av individer med 
slike evner. Siden feltet av tekstene er så store, og mye ikke er oversatt, valgte jeg å basere 
meg hovedsakelig på sekundærlitteratur. I denne oppgaven tar jeg for meg tre artikler som 
handler om tekster fra 3 forskjellige indiske tradisjoner. Jeg ser på diskusjoner om 
beskrivelser av overnaturlige evner oppnådd gjennom yoga i Mahābhārata, gjennom 
praksisen av mantrasiddhi i Pāñcarātra-teksten Jayākhyasaṃhitā, samt en diskusjon om 
beskrivelser av kategoriene «magi» og «mirakel» i hagiografiske tekster om bhakti-
helgener fra Nord India. Deretter diskuterer jeg disse ved hjelp av diskursanalyse og 
diskursteori, for å vise at de overnaturlige evnene beskrevet i disse tekstene er del av større 
diskurser som alle handler om makt.  
 
